THE FREE SPEECH METAMORPHOSIS
OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
David S. Bogen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The trouble with all explanations of historic causes is the absence of quantification: you never can say how much of the given
cause was necessary to provide how much effect, or how much of
the cause there was. I regard this as the source of the most subtle
fallacies. But such exercitations always are amusing and tickling if
1
new.
In the spring of 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing for a unanimous United States Supreme Court, upheld the convictions of Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer under the Espionage
Act of 1917 for their role in distributing antidraft circulars to draftees.2 Holmes found that the circulars posed a clear and present danger to the recruiting service in World War I. 3 The following week,
Holmes again spoke for a unanimous Court in affirming the Espionage Act convictions of Jacob Frohwerk4 and Eugene V. Debs, both
of whom had condemned the draft publicly-Frohwerk by publish* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. B.A. 1962, L.L.B. 1965, Harvard University. LL.M. 1967, New York University. This essay grew out of a seminar conducted by Professor Robert Cover at Yale University under the auspices of the National Endowment for the
Humanities. The sponsorship of NEH and the assistance of Professor Cover is gratefully acknowledged. My colleagues William Reynolds, Kenneth Abraham, Andrew King and Peter
Quint of the University of Maryland School of Law also provided helpful criticism. Finally,
Mrs. Erica Chadbourn, curator of the manuscript collection at Harvard Law School, was invaluable in making the correspondence of Justice Holmes with Professor Chafee available to
me along with Holmes' correspondence with Felix Frankfurter and the notes of Justice Brandeis' conversations with Frankfurter. My thanks to Mrs. Chadbourn, to Professor Freund for
the Brandeis papers, and to Professor Morris L. Cohen, now the Yale Librarian for permission
to quote from these materials.
1. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick and Lady Pollock (September 24, 1904), reprinted in 1 HOLMEs-PoLLOCK Larraas 118 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
2. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3. For a discussion of Holmes' clear and present danger test, see infra notes 300-76 and
accompanying text.
4. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
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ing certain antiwar articles, Debs by making a number of public
speeches condemning the war and the conscription effort.5 This time,
Holmes made no mention of any "clear and present danger."
Frohwerk and Debs, though opposed to both the draft and the war,
never specifically told their audiences to violate any law. As the author of these three opinions, Holmes seemed a symbol of the forces
of suppression of speech.'
In the fall of 1919, Holmes broke with his brethren. In Abrams
v. United States,7 joined only by Justice Brandeis, he dissented from
the Espionage Act convictions of several Russian aliens who had
published leaflets opposing American intervention in the Soviet
Union and calling for a general strike by workers in munitions factories.8 Holmes pleaded eloquently in his Abrams dissent for freedom
of speech and argued that the actions of these defendants posed no
clear and present danger of bringing about unlawful acts.9 As a result of this dissent, Holmes was hailed as a champion of freedom of
speech, a distinction he maintained during the following decade of
10
service on the Court.
The view of recent commentators who have attempted to explain this apparent turnabout in Holmes' view of free speech is that
Holmes had a vision in the summer of 1919 on the road from his
persecution of the antiwar defendants in Schenck,11 Frohwerk,1 2 and
Debs13 to his dissent in Abrams." For example, Professor Fred D.
Ragan has argued that the criticism during the summer of the Debs
decision by Zechariah Chafee, Jr. caused Holmes to alter his views
on the first amendment.15 Harry Kalven and Douglas Ginsburg have
pointed to Ernst Freund's criticism of Debs as instrumental in effectuating the change, 16 while Gerald Gunther has set forth the claims
5. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 350-65.
7. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
8. Id. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10. Holmes continued his championship of free speech in dissent in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) and United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S.
644, 653 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
11. 249 U.S. 47.
12. 249 U.S. 204.
13. 249 U.S. 211.
14. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and The Clear
and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year. 1919, 58 J. AM. Hisr. 24 (1971).
16. Ginsburg, Afterward to Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U.
CHi. L. REv. 243 (1973); Kalven, Professor Ernst Freund and Debs v. United States, 40 U.
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for the influence on Holmes of Judge Learned Hand.1" The difficulty
with these theories is that Holmes later claimed he was already converted when the visions of Chafee, Freund and Hand appeared. The
clear and present danger test relied on by Holmes in his Abrams
dissent was first enunciated by him in Schenck, and Holmes never
repented his decisions in Schenck, Frohwerk or Debs.18 Yet some
truth remains to the speculations about Holmes' development of free
speech theory over the summer of 1919. The classic dissent in
Abrams has a sharply different tone from his earlier majority opinions. The convert became a missionary.
It is a thesis of this article that the different tone of the Abrams
dissent is not evidence of a marked change in Holmes' view of free
speech, but is rather the product of Holmes' frustration at what he
considered the misreading by critics and the public of his position in
Schenck. The same constitutional standard that Holmes urged in
Abrams to protect the defendant's speech was consistently applied in
upholding the convictions in Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs. Tracing
the development of Holmes' view of free speech throughout his legal
career will demonstrate both that the major step was taken in
Schenck and that the seeds of what became the "clear and present
danger" doctrine were planted early in Holmes' life, though Holmes'
skepticism and his reluctance to depart from prevailing legal doctrine combined to prevent those seeds from bearing fruit until his
seventies.
Holmes mentioned several of the sources from which the "clear
and present danger" test first articulated in Schenck was derived in
an exchange of letters with Zechariah Chafee, Jr. of Harvard Law
School. Several years after Schenck, Chafee wrote Holmes:
This brings to mind a question that I have long intended to ask you
-whether this definition of freedom of speech in the Schenck case
was at all suggested to you by any writers on the subject or was the
result entirely of your reflections. Since you hit the nail, in my
opinion, so squarely on the head, I am wondering whether you had
been aiming at it for a long while and whether you had learned of
others who had at least succeeded in mashing their fingers someCmi. L. Rav. 235 (1973).
17. Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975).
18. "I never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law that alone were
before this Court in the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs, 249 U.S. 47, 204, 211, were
rightly decided." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. at 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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where in the neighborhood of the same nail. 19

Holmes replied
Massachusetts:

from his summer

home in Beverly

Farms,

My Dear Professor Chafee
Your letter arrives here just after myself-and I must make a
hurried answer. The expression that you refer to was not helped by
any book that I know-I think it came without doubt after the
later cases (and probably you-I do not remember exactly) had
taught me that in the earlier Paterson [sic] case, if that was the
name of it, I had taken Blackstone and Parker of Mass as well
founded, wrongly. I surely was ignorant. But I did think hard on
the matter of attempts in my Common Law and a Mass case, later
in the Swift case (U.S.) And I thought it out unhelped. I noted
that Bishop made a slight modification of his text after I had
printed but without reference to me-I speak from ancient memory-And much later I found an English Nisi Prius case in which
20
one of the good judges had expressed this notion in a few words.

"I surely was ignorant." This article will begin by examining
the sources of Holmes' "ignorance"--his legal education and his
early years on the bench. At the same time, it will consider and examine various influences throughout Holmes' life which eventually
aided him in shedding his ignorance. It will then move on to an analysis of the period of time during which Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs
and Abrams were decided as well as an examination of the cases
themselves, with a view toward learning how, when, and why
Holmes finally revised his understanding of the first amendment.
19. Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr. to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (June 9, 1922)
Box 14, Folder 12, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Papers on file at Manuscript Division, Harvard Law
School Library.
20. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (June 12, 1922)
Box 14, Folder 12, Zechariah Chafes, Jr. Papers (on file at Manuscript Division, Harvard Law
School Library). Holmes' handwriting is often rather difficult to decipher. The reference to the
Patterson case in the quote was referred to as the "Patriotic" case and identified as Schenck v.
United States in Ragan, supra note 15, at 26. The error is explicable because Holmes' vague
memory of the case caused him to misspell the name. Closer inspection of the letter reveals the
error. The reference to Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), is logical because in that
case Holmes cited Parker's opinion in Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304
(1826), which relied on Blackstone, and because he was responding to an inquiry about the
new test in Schenck. Ragan's error, however, has had far-reaching consequences, for it has
focused scholarly attention on the changing attitude in Holmes' free speech opinions between
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919). See supra notes 15-17.
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THE ACQUISITION OF IGNORANCE: BLACKSTONE'S DEFINITION

"[Iln the earlier Paterson [sic] case, if that was the name of
it, I had taken Blackstone and Parker of Mass as well-founded,
wrongly. I surely was ignorant." 21
At least three different views of freedom of speech existed in the
United States in the middle of the nineteenth century. One view,
exemplified by Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
and adopted by many state courts, held that the phrase "freedom of
the press" referred to the absence of prior restraint, but placed no
limit on the subsequent punishment of expression. 2 Freedom of
speech, according to Blackstone, was merely the ability of individuals to speak freely and required no separate legal protection; however, while everyone had the ability to speak or write what they desired, the state had the power to punish them for what they said.2
A second view, stated by the English Whig pamphleteers
Trenchard and Gordon in Cato's Letters and found in specific provisions in many state statutes and state constitutions, added to Blackstone's definition the proposition that truthful criticism of government was a civic duty and should not be punished if engaged in with
good motives and for lawful ends.2
Finally, a third view, grounded in considerations of federalism
and states' rights and reflected in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, maintained that the first amendment was the mirror image of
a constricted interpretation of federal power under the Constitution. 25 Under this view, grants of power to the federal government
should be narrowly construed, and the first amendment merely reflected the Framers' understanding that Congress had been granted
no power over speech or publication and that these matters were left
to state control.
The first time that Holmes interpreted the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech and press as a United States Su21. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (June 12, 1922)
Box 14, Folder 12, Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Papers (on file at Manuscript Division, Harvard Law
School Library).
22. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 152 (7th ed.
1775); L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 201-14 (1960).
23. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at 150-52.
24. See L. LEvy, supra note 22, at 116-20 (Cato letters), 192-200 (general discussion of
truth as a defense).
25. See the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 in IV THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 540-41 (2nd
ed. 1941); The Virginia Resolution of 1798, id., at 528.

HeinOnline -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 101 1982-19832

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:97

preme Court Justice he adopted Blackstone's definition. 2 That
Holmes later, when he was nearly eighty, adopted a completely different, much broader view of the amendment is remarkable; it becomes even more so when one realizes that in other respects,
Holmes' values and constitutional principles underwent little change
after he reached seventy. 7 Only with respect to free speech did a
complete metamorphosis occur. 28 It seems implausible that this unusual turnaround could be brought about by one or two events or
influences so late in his life. Thus, examination of the young Holmes
must simultaneously focus on two discrete inquiries: one into how
Holmes developed his adherence to Blackstone, the other into the
forces present early in his life that set the stage for his eventual repudiation of Blackstone.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was raised in Cambridge, Massa26. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907): "In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent
punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare." (citations omitted).
27. "[A]t my age a man has his final formula made up, and my cosmos goes into a
pretty small package. It is not likely to change its contents very much, or to let in either Hegel
or the Catholic Church." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (December 30, 1903) reprinted in THE HOLMEs-ENsTEIN LETrERS 8-9 (J.B. Peabody ed. 1964).
"Holmes at least has found his dominant conceptions before he was forty and never thereafter saw any reason to change them." F. BIDDLE, MR. JusnicE HOLMES 85 (1943).
As further evidence of Holmes' adherence to long-held views, specifically involving a constitutional interpretation, one only need recognize that Holmes' willingness to permit legislative action, as seen in Tyson Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (state has power to limit mark up of theater ticket prices by ticket agencies) and Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (state can regulate hours of
work for bakers) was prefigured by his opinion on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 123 (1891) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (state can
forbid employer from withholding wages because of imperfections in employees' work).
The values and constitutional principles to which Holmes consistently adhered have been
subject to quite different critical review at different times. See White, The Rise and Fall of
Mr. Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 51 (1972). His insensitivity to modern civil liberties
concerns was pressed by Yosal Rogat in a series of articles, see, e.g., Mr. Justice Holmes: A
Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3, 254 (1962-63) and The Judge as Spectator, 31 U.
Cm.L. REv. 213 (1964). Even his first amendment decisions are open to criticism on modern
standards. See Gunther, supra note 17. Nevertheless, the historic importance of Holmes' dissent in the Abrams case for the development of constitutional protection for speech has not
been questioned.
28. Despite the attractions of psycho-history to explain the value choices and principles
of an individual (see, e.g., H. N. HIRSCH, THE ENIaMA oF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981)), it
would appear less relevant than traditional studies of legal materials to explain the change of
position on a particular issue by one who had already developed a mature philosophy. Thus,
although brief excursions into the speculative realm of individual psychology are attempted,
see, e.g., Infra notes 445-61 and accompanying text, the focus of this essay is on the broader
range of ideas and legal arguments which affected Holmes' position.
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chusetts and entered Harvard there in 1857.29 Holmes' exposure to
Civil War-era Massachusetts may well have driven him away, at the
outset, from the view of free speech reflected in the Kentucky and
Virginia Resolutions. 0 Massachusetts in the mid-1800's was a center
of antislavery sentiment; the invocation by the slave states of the
South of the "states' rights" doctrine to fend off attempts by the

federal legislature to limit slavery-born of the same fear of the national legislature that was the underpinning of the view that Congress could not regulate speech-received a cold reception in the abolitionist northern climate of the Bay State. 31 The federal
29. 1 M. HOWE, JUSTICE OUVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS, 1841-1870
1-40 (1957).
30. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, the original draft of which was prepared by Thomas Jefferson, and the Virginia Resolution of 1798, drawn by James Madison,
were drafted, and adopted by the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures, in response to a number
of repressive and, they argued, unconstitutional laws passed in 1798 by a largely Federalist
Congress, see infra note 101. See also Virginia Resolution of 1798, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (J.

Elliot 2d ed. 1836); Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, id. at 540. The Resolution argued for a narrow reading of the powers delegated to the federal government by the states
under the Constitution; for example, the first Kentucky Resolution described the federal government as "a general government for special purposes, delegated . . .certain definite powers,
reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government." Id.
The Resolutions represented the view of Jefferson's Republican party, which assumed power
beginning in 1800 with Jefferson's election to the presidency; the party in power during the
early years of the United States, however, was the Federalist party, which drew its primary
support from northern states like Massachusetts. As a result, those northern states flatly rejected the view represented by the Resolutions. See J. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 241
(1960). See also J. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM 171-72 (1951). After Jefferson became President, some New England men argued for a break with the union, but without opposing the
idea of a strong national government. See 1 M. HOWE, supra note 29, at 180.
31. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were used in southern arguments in the
1830's as a basis for defending slavery from potential interference by the federal government.
W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 1760-1848,
130-31. Although the Republican party in the 1850's seemed to adhere to the doctrine that
slavery was a local matter, the proslavery southern states were afraid of federal power under
the Republicans and urged secession. D. POTTER, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN THE SESSION
CRISIS 1-40 (1942). Northern disunionists like Garrison and Phillips sought to disentangle the
nonslave states from the infection of slavery, but they based their argument on the evils of the
Constitution rather than on any theory that the federal government was violating it. W.
WIECEK, supra, at 228-48.
The strongest abolitionist position favoring states' rights was the view that the fugitive
slave law was unconstitutional. See Sumner, "Duties of Massachusetts at This Crisis." A
Speech Delivered at the Repulican Convention at Worcester (Sept. 7, 1854), reprinted in W.
PEASE & J. PEASE, THE ANTI-SLAvERY ARGUMENT 440-45 (1965); W. WIECEK, supra at 99100. Yet the Republican slogan "Freedom national and slavery sectional" was not hostile to
federal power. It reflected the pragmatic desire to oppose slavery in whatever way possible confining federal power where it was used against fugitive slaves but using federal power to
eliminate slavery where possible beyond the borders of the southern slave states.
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government posed no threat to antislavery advocates in Holmes'
youth.3 2 Indeed, it was the southern states that pressed state rights
that posed the greatest danger to abolitionist speech. Thus, southern
arguments for stringent limits on federal power over speech sounded
hollow to northern ears.
The antislavery movement was, however, inextricably linked
with demands for freedom of speech. Abolitionists were threatened
by private mobs, such as the one that killed the printer Lovejoy in
Alton, Illinois,33 and by state laws in the southern states that forbade
the spread of abolitionist sentiments.3 4 The abolitionists responded to
the state laws by arguing that truthful criticism of government
should be allowed. They set forth various reasons why such speech
should be protected and linked repression of speech with slavery. 5
William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips, prominent abolitionists, denounced the
union as created under a proslavery compact and called for secession by the northern states to
avoid contamination with the slaveholding south. W. WIECEK, supra, at 228-48 (1977). The
plea for separation suggests the same resentment of federal power found in the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions, but Garrison and Phillips explicitly stated that the federal government
had power under the constitution. Id. It was not an interpretation of the Constitution, but the
Constitution itself they wished to repudiate.
"Despite their diversity, the antislavery enthusiasts agreed on one thing: slavery was
wrong and ought to be ended. That, however, was about the only thing on which they could
agree. About the what there was no dissension; over the how there was no unity." W. PEASE &
J. PEASE, supra, at 440-45.
While Garrison and Phillips thought the Constitution evil because it supported slavery, a
less prominent group of abolitionists advocated the exercise of federal power, believing that the
Constitution was opposed to slavery. See J. TEN BROECK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 66-93 (1965).
These radicals were entirely opposed to the narrow views of federal power voiced in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.
Still other antislavery advocates pursued more pragmatic policies. They accepted slavery
in the south as beyond the reach of federal power, but desired every exercise of federal
power-over the District of Columbia, over the Territories, over the admission of new states,
over interstate trade to repudiate slavery. See Charles Sumner, "Duties of Massachusetts at
This Crisis." A Speech Delivered at the Republican Convention at Worcester, (Sept. 7, 1854),
reprinted In W. PEASE & J. PEASE, supra, at 440-45 (1965).
32. There was some debate in the 1830's over banning abolitionist literature from the
federal mails. The debate was resolved in theory in 1836 by a law which adopted a principle of
non-interference. See R. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM:

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CON-

(1830-1860) 69-81 (1963). A related issue involved the refusal of the House of
Representatives to consider antislavery petitions. The fight made John Quincy Adams a heroic
figure, but its constitutional focus was the right to petition for redress of grievances rather
than freedom of speech. Id. at 41-66. By 1850, however, controversy over the federal government's relationship to free speech no longer had a featured place.
33. See Id. at 145-52.
34. Id. at 154-58, 175-76. "With the exception of Kentucky, every Southern state eventually passed laws controlling and limiting speech, press and discussion." Id. at 175.
35. See "Speech of Mr. Gerrit Smith" in New York Antislavery Convention, Proceedings of the III Convention, Held at Utica (October 21, 1835); New York Anti-slavery State

TROVERSY
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They were, however, deprived of the one argument that would immediately occur to the reader of today-that such state laws violate the
constitution-by an inescapable fact: Prior to the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, the federal Constitution placed no limit on
state regulation of speech. 6 Thus, the abolitionists were forced to
resort to reason or to natural law rather than to the protection of the
first amendment.
Appeals to the protection of free speech guarantees in state constitutions were also futile. Southern states with state constitutional
protections for free speech simply used Blackstone's definition to uphold the subsequent punishment of antislavery speech.37 Once again,
the abolitionists were forced to invoke an ideal of individual and governmental tolerance of dissenting ideas rather than appeal to legal
limits on governmental power to regulate speech.
Abolitionist speakers, as mentioned above, were threatened with
suppression by private intolerance that was as repressive as southern
state laws.38 Mob rule could effectively gag the most dedicated orator, and the authorities would often stand idly by while abolitionist
speakers were threatened with violence. Protection against this
threat required a public perception that lawlessness and intolerance
were wrong. 9 It was thus not a question of constitutional limits on
government, but rather an issue of the public moral climate for
speech.
Holmes was not unaware of this struggle for the right to free
speech. While he was in college, he joined with classmates to protect
Wendell Phillips when the great abolitionist orator spoke at the annual antislavery convention in Boston. The power and fervor of
Phillips' advocacy and the condemnation of interferences with free
speech may have impressed the young man. Phillips stressed, however, the opposition of the Constitution, which judges were obligated
to enforce, to the moral universe which should exist.," Thus, Holmes
was confronted with the dichotomy that he would be faced with
Society Held at Peterboro (October 22, 1835) reprintedin W. PEASE & J. PEASE, supra note
31, at 257-60. See also R. NYE, supra note 32, at 171-73.
36. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding the Bill of Rights inapplicable to the states).
37. R. NYE, supra note 32, at 157-58.
38. Id. at 145-52.
39. Id. at 158-62, 176-77.
40. 1 M. HowE, supra note 29, at 65-68.
41. W. Phillips, "Can Abolitionists Vote or Take Office Under the United States Constitution" (1845), reprinted in W. PEASE & J. PEASE, supra note 31, at 459-73.
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again and again-free speech praised as an abstract value, but broad
government power to suppress speech accepted as prevailing constitutional law.
With the onset of war, concern for individual rights of expression moved further into the background, at least in the areas where
the war raged. Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus and
42
many suspected confederate sympathizers were rounded up.
Holmes, serving on the front lines in the Union army, probably discussed the New York City draft riots with his companions and was
thus aware of the need for strong measures. The echoes of this
awareness may be seen in The Common Law almost two decades
later: "No society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence. If conscripts are necessary for its
army, it seizes them, and marches them, with bayonets in their rear,
to death. ' 43 Again, the power of a government to regulate the behavior of its private citizens, and the special necessity for such power in
wartime, was brought home to Holmes; he remained aware of this
special necessity even half a century later."
At the same time, however, the commitment of the confederate
soldiers to their cause and the courage of some of his Union comrades who faced death daily 45 while criticizing the justice of the
42.

See 5 C. SWISHER,

TANEY PERIOD

HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE

1836-64, 841-66, 901-30 (1974).

43. 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 43 (1881). See 1 M. HOWE, supra note 29,
at 144-45.
44. "When the nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and
that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. at 52. "When people are putting out all their energies in battle I don't think

it unreasonable to say we won't have obstacles intentionally put in the way of raising
troops-by persuasion any more than by force." Letter from Holmes to Herbert Croly, May
12, 1919 (not sent to Croly, but enclosed with a letter from Holmes to Laski, May 13, 1919),
reprinted in I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 202, 203-04 (M. Howe ed. 1953).

45. That death was the constant companion of Holmes and his comrades cannot be
doubted. Holmes himself was seriously wounded several times. See 1 M. HowE supra note 25,
at 102-08 (Holmes' account of his wound and expectation of death at Ball's Bluff), 124-30
(Antietam), and 154-55 (Chancellorsville).
Holmes' brushes with death remained in his memory throughout his life. For example:
"October 21, '61-(67 years ago) was Balls Bluff." Letter from 0. W. Holmes, Jr. to Harold
J. Laski, OctoblEr 24, 1928, reprintedin 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1105 (M. Howe ed. 1953);

"On the 17th I drank a glass of wine (contrary to my custom when I am alone at home) to the
living and the dead, it being the anniversary of Antietam, where 1862-1908-46 years ago (!)
I was shot through the neck." Letter from 0. W. Holmes to Cannon Patrick Augustine

Sheehan (September 21, 1908), reprintedin HOLMES-SHEEHAN

CORRESPONDENCE

ton ed. 1976).
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Union's position led Holmes to doubt that his notions of right had
any better claim of universal validity than the right conceived by his
neighbor. 4 6 "I used to say when I was young that truth is the majority vote of that nation that can lick all others."4 7 This initial skepticism emerges, full blown, half a century later in the famous Abrams
"marketplace of ideas" dissent; 48 in the early 1860's, however, any
skepticism Holmes may have felt about the "truth" of the Union's
cause, or the need to suppress criticism as a means of assuring loyalty, was balanced by the perception of the needs of government during wartime and the emotional commitment of participating in the
suppression of the seceding southern states.

III.

HOLMES' LEGAL EDUCATION

In July of 1864, Holmes returned home from the Civil War,
and soon entered law school.4 9 In some respects, his encounters with
free speech there resembled his exposure to the Massachusetts of his
youth and to the antislavery advocates. The limits on federal power
over speech derived from states' rights arguments were ignored, the
expression of honest criticism in the abstract was praised, but the
narrow definition of Blackstone was acknowledged as existing law. In
fact, Holmes' exposure to free speech concepts in law school was
probably narrower, and more traditional, than had been his experience in college and in the war, where he was at least exposed to
some broad advocacy of free speech.
Like many law students before him, Holmes commenced the
study of law with Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England.5 0 Blackstone began his section on libel by discuss46.

See Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64

HARV.

L.

REV.

529, 536-37

(1951).
47. O.W. Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 132 HARV. L. RE. 40, 40 (1918).
48. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes' marketplace of ideas theory stressed that the "basic test of truth" focuses on whether the idea
would be "accepted in the competition of the market." Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
49. 1 M. HOWE, supra note 29, at 176.
50. Holmes kept a list of books that he had read. The first book on Holmes' reading list
during his first year of law school was Blackstone's Commentaries. Little, The Early Reading
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, VIII Har'. Lib. Bull. 163, 168 (1954). Holmes presumably
read George Sharswood's edition of 1859, for on page 2 of the advertisements in the front of
the second edition of Sharswood is a statement from Theophilus Parsons, a professor of
Holmes at Harvard Law School, endorsing the 1859 edition. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed. Sharswood ed. 1866). Parson's choice of Sharswood's

edition is significant, because the most famous prior edition was ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES: AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
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ing seditious libel, or libel against the government. He pointed out
that such attacks on government are injurious to the maintenance of
order and may therefore be punished whether they are true or
false. 51 Such doctrine might be thought by some to subvert the liberty of the press, but Blackstone felt that "[t]he liberty of the press
consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matters when published. 5 2
Blackstone added that if any man "publishes what is improper mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own
temerity." 53
Blackstone was simply restating the common law of England.
There was no prior restraint of speech in England at that time; the
system of prior censorship there lapsed in 1694 and was never renewed.54 Libel, slander and seditious libel could, however, all lead to
censure under the common law, and the King in Parliament could
punish any offense without being subject to any judicial check.55 Admittedly, the constitutional structure of the United States is different
from that of England, and Holmes might have ignored Blackstone's
definition as irrelevant to conditions here. Blackstone, however, was
also expressly made part of Holmes' education in American law.
For the young law student the basic text on American law was
Kent's Commentaries on American Law.56 Although the organiza(1803). Tucker repudiated Blackstone's definition of freedom of speech in an extended essay-Appendix to Volume First, Part Second of Blackstone's Commentaries, Note G, "Of the
Right of Conscience, and of the Freedom of Speech and of the Press." Thus, Holmes missed
early exposure to the Jeffersonian attack on Blackstone. He might have had an indirect exposure to the Jeffersonian viewpoint through Story's sharp attack on Tucker's essay in J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

672-75 (3d ed. 1858). Holmes'

reading list for his law school career did not include Story's Commentaries, but the list may
not have been complete.
51. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 150 (7th ed. 1775).
52. Id. at 151-52.
53. Id. at 152.
54. R. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29
HARV. L. REV. 640, 650 (1916). See F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 14761776, 260-65 (1952).
55. "The King in Parliament" refers to the King and Parliament together. By the time
Blackstone wrote, Parliament had become the predominant force in English law, although
George IIl could still manipulate it through his appointment of ministers. See generally W.
BAGEIIOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1872). Nevertheless, parliamentary
supremacy-the notion that there was no document or constitution which was supreme as to
Parliament and could be applied by courts meant that no court would invalidate a statute on
grounds that it interfered with free speech.
56. Kent's Commentaries was the fourth book on Holmes' reading list. Little, supra note
50, at 168.
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tion of Kent's text in some ways paralleled that of Blackstone, the
section on libel and slander began in a very different tone:
The liberal communication of sentiment, and entire freedom of discussion, in respect to the character and conduct of public men, and
of candidates for public favor, is deemed essential to the judicious
exercise of the right of suffrage, and of that control over their rulers, which resides in the free people of the United States.6
In his capacity as a state court judge, Chancellor Kent had adopted,
in People v. Croswell,s8 Alexander Hamilton's argument"9 that truth
should be admitted in evidence under New York law as a defense to
a charge of libel. 60 However, while this opinion was reflected in the

tone of Kent's Commentaries, it was expressed as exhortation rather
than as a statement of prevailing law. The Commentaries also attempted to set forth the existing principles of law, and the majority
of state courts had not followed the views Kent had expressed as
judge. Even his own court had been evenly divided in Croswell, and
the conviction there was upheld."1 In his Commentaries, Kent admitted: "[T]he weight of judicial authority undoubtedly is that the En-

glish common law doctrine of libel [in which truth was not a defense] is the common law doctrine in this country, in all cases in

which it has not been expressly controlled by constitutional or legislative provisions. "162
One of the cases to which Kent devoted considerable attention
in Commentaries was Commonwealth v. Blanding.3 Holmes and his
fellow students in Cambridge must have paid particular attention to
57. 2 J.KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 17 (12th ed. 1873). Holmes presumably read the 10th edition of Kent, edited by Richard McCurdy and Wm.Henry Forman and
published in 1860, in which the section on liberty of the press is contained in the first volume,
pp. 631-42, but with internal references to denote that the section was originally in volume II.
See id., (10th ed.) at 610. When Holmes took over the editorship for the twelfth edition, he
returned to Kent's original division.
58. 3 Johns. Cas. 336 (N.Y. 1804).
59. Id. at 352 (Hamilton, argument for appellee).
60. Id. at 393-94 (opinion of Kent, J.)Kent was a Federalist opposed to Jefferson, and a
supporter of the Alien and Sedition Acts, as his Commentaries demonstrate. See KENT, supra
note 55, at 24. Croswell was prosecuted for libelling Jefferson. In his opinion in Croswell, Kent
wrote, "the liberty of the press consists in the right to publish, with impunity, truth, with good
motives, and for justifiable ends, whether it respects government, magistracy, or individuals."
See Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. at 392-93 (N.Y. 1804). In his Commentaries, he was not quite as
explicit; see J. KENT, supra note 57, at 20.
61. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. at 361-62.
62. J.KENT, supra note 57, at 21.
63. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825). See J. KENT, supra note 57, at 21-22.
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Blanding because it was a Massachusetts case. At issue in Blanding
was the Massachusetts constitutional provision stating that "[ihe
Liberty of the press

. . .

ought not.

. .

to be restrained."es The de-

fendant, who had stated in a newspaper that an individual kept a
public house in an improper manner, offered to prove the truth of the
allegation as a defense, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that truth was irrelevant in a libel action. Accusations
of misconduct must be made through legal proceedings in order to
be privileged, the Court said, and not through public accusation. Alluding to the claim that such a ruling violated the guaranteed freedom of the press contained in the Massachusetts Constitution, Chief
Justice Isaac Parker said:
Besides, it is well understood, and received as a commentary on
this provision for liberty of the press, that it was intended to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been
practised by other governments, and in early times here, to stifle
the efforts of patriots towards enlightening their fellow subjects
upon their rights and the duties of rulers. The Liberty of the press
was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in
case of its abuse.6 5

With respect to the holding in Blanding that truth was not relevant as a defense to libel, Kent noted with some satisfaction that the
Massachusetts legislature almost immediately thereafter enacted a
statute that provided that truth published with good motives and for
justifiable ends would be a defense.66 He did not, however, criticize
the interpretation Parker gave of the Massachusetts constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press.67 Kent's concern was to suggest
64. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Const. Art. XVI (1780, amend. 1948) (West 1968).
65. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 313. In 1789, Chief Justice Cushing and John Adams in letters to each other agreed that Article 16 of the Massachusetts constitution repudiated the view of Blackstone and permitted truth as a defense. See Letters from William Cushing to John Adams (Feb. 18, 1789) and from John Adams to William Cushing (March 7,
1789), reprinted in, L. LEvY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 147-53
(1966) (footnotes omitted). The correspondence was not available to Parker, of course, and he
behaved like most judges of the period in adopting Blackstone's definition of liberty of the
press rather than departing from the norms that prevailed prior to the revolution. "The doctrine laid down by Mr. Justice Blackstone respecting the liberty of the press had not been
repudiated (as far as is known) by any solemn decision of any of the State courts, in regard to
their own municipal jurisprudence." J. STORY, supra note 50, at 617.
66. J. KENT, supra note 57, at 21.
67. Id. Kent even tried to justify the Blanding decision: "[Blanding] went only to control
the malicious abuse or licentiousness of the press, and that is the most effectual way to preserve its freedom in the genuine sense of the constitutional declarations on the subject." Id.

HeinOnline -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 110 1982-19832

1982]

HOLMES AND FREE SPEECH

that legislatures and courts should act by decision, statute or constitutional amendment to assure that truth could be given in evidence

in trials for libel. Holmes and his fellow students, reading Kent, were
again confronted with a broader view of freedom of speech as an
abstract "good," but with Blackstone's as "the law":
These provisions in favor of giving the truth in evidence are to be
found only in those constitutions which have been promulgated
long since our Revolution; and the current of opinion seems to have
been setting strongly, not only in favor of erecting barriers against
any previous restraints upon publications (and which was all that
the earliersages of the Revolution had in view), but in favor of the
policy that would diminish or destroy altogether every obstacle or
responsibility in the way of the publication of the truth.6"

Kent's own view of how broadly the constitutional principles of
freedom of speech should be read sounded far more liberal than that

of Blackstone. "'[Elvery citizen,'" he wrote, "'may freely speak,
write, and publish his sentiments, on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that right, and . . . no law can rightfully be passed

to restrain or abridge the freedom of speech or of the press.' "69 If
the legislature determines that particular speech is an abuse of the
right to free speech, however, Kent's concession that the speaker is
"responsible for the abuse of that right""° was in accord with Blackstone's views.71 Thus, although Kent personally believed that truth
offered with good motives should not be punishable, his Commenta68. Id. at 23 (emphasis added). State statutes and new constitutional provisions expressly provided for truth as a defense; as the quoted passage indicates, Kent approved. Further, Kent himself went beyond Blackstone in Croswell, see supra note 58. It is not clear,
however, whether his Commentaries took a firm position.
69. J. KENT, supra note 57, at 17.
70. Id. Blackstone assumed that writings would be punished only if they had a pernicious tendency. This is the same thought as responsibility for "abuse" of the right of speech.
Nevertheless, Blackstone believed that "any dangerous or offensive writings," even true statements, which tended to bring the government into contempt had a pernicious tendency and
thus supported the common law of seditious libel. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at 152
(emphasis added). Given Croswell, Kent surely would not have agreed that such criticism is an
abuse. The Commentaries, however, never quite come out flatly with a statement that a legislative enactment which condemned seditious libel even if true would be unconstitutional. In
any event, when Holmes was studying law, truth published with good motives and for justifiable end was a defense either by statute or specific constitutional provision in most states. See
generally J. KENT, supra note 57, at 24. See also supra text accompanying note 64. Kent
suggested no further refinement for determining when an "abuse" of speech occurred, and as a
result could be cited to support virtually any restrictive law that state legislatures would be
likely to enact.
71. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at 152.
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ries did not explicitly repudiate the validity of Blackstone's formulation as the prevailing definition of freedom of the press. Kent's arguments were based on social policy, on what the law ought to be,
rather than on what was required by state constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech and press.
Kent's Commentaries served American law students as a statement of existing law. There had been, to that date, no definitive Supreme Court interpretation of the federal first amendment free
speech and press provisions. On the other hand, Chief Justice Parker
had interpreted just such a provision in the Massachusetts Constitution using Blackstone's terms. With no later decisions in Massachusetts on that point, Commonwealth v. Blanding72 thus stood as "the
meaning" of freedom of speech to young lawyers like Holmes planning to practice in Massachusetts.
Holmes found Blackstone's view of free speech further supported in Timothy Walker's Introduction to American Law.73
Whereas ambiguity existed in Kent's treatment of Blackstone and
free speech, Walker seemed to swallow the whole of Blackstone's
view. "The doctrine then is," Walker wrote, "that the liberty of
speech and of the press consists in freedom from previous censorship
or restraint, and not in exemption from subsequent liability for the
injury which may thereby be done." 7' 4 With a bow to a rhetorical
tradition of freedom, Walker added, "[tihe truth ought to be published, when it concerns the public to know it. '7 5 This phrase, however, did not suggest much of a limitation on the legislature's determination of when "it concerns the public to know it."
In December of 1865, Holmes stopped attending law school and
began clerking for a private attorney. During his entire law school
career, then, his only recorded exposure to views on the meaning of
constitutional free speech guarantees had come from writers who
had accepted Blackstone's definition of free speech as "no prior restraints" or had at least failed to clearly explain in what way they
differed.
72. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825).
73. T. WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW (1837). Holmes also read Walker,
see Little, supra note 50, at 169.
74. T. WALKER, supra note 73, at 189. The quoted language made direct reference to
such provisions in state constitutions, but he also said, "This qualification is tacitly annexed to
every species of civil liberty."
75. Id.
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IV.

HOLMES AS LEGAL SCHOLAR: ENGLAND

After receiving his degree from Harvard in the spring of 1866,
Holmes took a vacation trip to England. Philosophy was one of his
greatest interests during college and the trip to England gave him an
opportunity to meet some of the English philosophers. One such
meeting was with a man whose views would later become important
to Holmes' view of free speech-John Stuart Mill.
His father wrote a letter to John Morley to obtain a letter of
introduction for his son to Mill. "He is a presentable youth," the
senior Holmes wrote of his son, "with fair antecedents, and is more
familiar with Mill's writings than most fellows of his years. 76 The
best known of Mill's works, and one with which Holmes was surely
familiar, was On Liberty."
In On Liberty, Mill set forth the utilitarian 8 proposition that
government had no legitimate power to suppress or punish expression, even if the vast majority of the populace supported such
76. F. BIDDLE, supra note 27, at 29.
77. Mill, On Liberty (1859), reprintedin J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 126 (M. Warnock
ed. 1970).
78. Utilitarianism, the school of philosophical thought which can be essentially summarized by the well-known phrase "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," is generally
acknowledged to have been begun by Jeremy Bentham with the publication of his Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation in 1789 (although the phrase itself first appeared,
in a slightly different form, in a pamphlet by Joseph Priestley, see J. S. MILL, supra note 77,
at 7 (editor's introduction)). Bentham was a friend of James Mill, the father of John Stuart
Mill; young John Stuart was steeped in utilitarian ideals by both his father and Bentham
throughout his early life, see id. at 8-10, and he later became perhaps the best philosopher of
Bentham's school, see id. at 9. That Mill, a utilitarian, made a powerful defense of freedom of
speech should not be taken to indicate that utilitarian thought and free speech are necessarily
compatible ideals. At least one other utilitarian contemporary of Mill-James Fitzjames Stephen-attacked Mill's On Liberty. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. In addition, it is
not difficult to bend utilitarianism to support suppression of speech; one can argue, for example, that criticism of a country's war effort, even if truthful, might cause a serious weakening
of the war effort (by encouraging the enemy, or causing draft resistance), which might in turn
threaten the safety of the citizens and perhaps even the existence of the country. Thus, the
argument concludes, suppression of the dangerous speech will shield the country, and its citizens, from the threatened harms and thereby bring about the greatest good for the greatest
number.
That utilitarian philosophy can be used as described above, combined with the attack on
Mill by Stephen and Holmes' general reluctance to confuse philosophy and legal doctrine,
should serve to remind the reader that Holmes' adherence to Blackstone after having been
exposed to Mill is not difficult to understand. What the reader must also remember, however,
is that these same factors indicate that Holmes' later adherence to Blackstone did not mean a
repudiation of Mill, but rather a reluctance to unilaterally import Mill's philosophy into the
text of the Constitution. This also makes his receptiveness to Mill years later, after he perceived a popular rejection of Blackstone, less difficult to understand, see infra note 517 and
accompanying text.
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suppression:
The power [to suppress speech] is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or
more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion,
than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one were of one
opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind
would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than
he, if
79
he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.
Mill, it is true, was an English philosopher, and Holmes surely
understood that his essay was not intended as a definition of American constitutional law or even a description of English common
law-that he was merely advocating free speech as a matter of
moral philosophy which could be deduced from the utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. Even so, Mill's view
that government had no power to suppress the voice of a single dissenter would have appeared as a vastly different view of speech than
that espoused by Blackstone.
Mill then went on to demonstrate how such suppression might
eventually injure the entire society by pointing out that time may
eventually prove the dissenter's to have been the voice of truth:
"[T]he opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may
possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its
truth; but they are not infallible." 80
As proof that suppressors may indeed be fallible, Mill pointed
to notable examples throughout history of ideas that, along with
those who espoused them, were ridiculed and attacked in their day
but which were eventually triumphant, like those of Socrates and
Jesus Christ.81
Mill then went on to elaborate on how freedom of expression
and debate will benefit society:
[M]an is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to
show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and
practices gradually yield to fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before
it. 82
79. J.S. MILL, supra note 77, at 142.
80. Id. at 143.
81. Id. at 150-54.
82. Id. at 146.
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Thus, Holmes was exposed to a position on free speech-that it
is necessary to help society discover and root out "wrong opinions
and practices"-which he would echo in Abrams, years later, in his
famed "marketplace of ideas" analogy.8
The young Holmes of 1866, however, was fresh from being
steeped in Blackstone through college and law school 8 4 and was
surely in no position to discard what he had been shown over and
over again to be "the law." Even his exposure to other philosophers
who, like Mill, claimed to be utilitarians, presented him with ambiguous views of speech. Returning from a lecture that he had attended
with Mill, Holmes fell into a long conversation with one such utilitarian, James Fitzjames Stephen, 5 who subsequently published an attack on On Liberty.8"
Stephen's attack, read by Holmes,87 against the free speech
view espoused by Mill in On Liberty proceeded on two levels. On the
idealistic level, Stephen disputed Mill's contention that freedom of
speech necessarily leads to the greatest good for the greatest number, pointing out various situations where suppression of even the
truth might be desirable.88 On a more concrete level, Stephen
pointed to the countervailing interests of the state that override
ideals like total freedom of speech.89 Thus, Holmes was again confronted with the familiar dichotomy-the rhetoric of free speech as
an ideal, but an acknowledgment of the reality and even the desirability of government power to suppress it.
V.

HOLMES AS LEGAL SCHOLAR: AMERICA

After his return from England, Holmes started work at the law
firm of Chandler, Shattuck & Thayer. 90 For the next several years,
Holmes developed his skills as a common law attorney, with free
speech issues fading into the background.
In 1869 Holmes began editing the twelfth edition of Kent's
83. "[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... the best
test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market
." Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
84. See supra notes 21-74 and accompanying text.
85. See 1 M. HOWE, supra note 29, at 227, 236-40.
86. J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (1873).
87. Howe assumed that Holmes had read Stephen's book. See 2 M. HOWE, JusTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 48 n.44 (1963).
88. J. STEPHEN, supra note 86, at 74-122.
89. Id. at 71-72.
90. 1 M. HOWE, supra note 29, at 245.
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Commentaries with its admission that Blackstone was still "the law"
on speech." The following year he opened his own law office, became
co-editor of The American Law Review and commenced a series of
lectures on constitutional law to juniors at the Harvard Law School;
92
the latter activity once again focused his attention on speech.
The textbook Holmes used in his lectures was Joseph Alden's
The Science of Government in Connection with American Institutions.93 It was not a very sophisticated book. Alden's treatment of
freedom of speech consisted of laying quotes from Blackstone and
from Kent, paraphrasing Blackstone, side by side:
An eminent jurist has remarked that freedom of the press consists
in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. "Every
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the
press. But if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal,
he must take the consequences of his own temerity. To censure the
licentiousness is to maintain the liberty of the press." Chancellor
Kent remarks: "It has become a constitutional principle in this
country that every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsiblefor the abuse of that
right; and that no law can rightfully
be passed to restrain or
19
abridge the freedom of the press.
Thus Holmes was again exposed to Blackstone and Kent in a
class at the Harvard Law School, this time as professor. If it did
nothing else, his exposure to Alden would have served to remind
Holmes that Blackstone was still "the law."
His exposure during this period to an influential view of free
speech which differed from Blackstone appears not to have had
much effect on Holmes at the time. In 1871, he reviewed the second
edition of Thomas Cooley's Constitutional Limitations5 for The
91.

Id. at 273. See J. KENT, supra note 57, at 22.

92.

1 M. HOWE, supra note 29, at 273.

93. See 2 M. HOWE, supra note 87, at 27-29.
94. J. ALDEN, THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT IN

CONNECTION WITH AMERICAN INSTI-

TUTIONS 200-01 (1868). As this passage suggests, it was easy to meld Chancellor Kent with
Blackstone, at least in an American setting where no one expected that mannerly, truthful

criticism of government offered at an appropriate time and place would be subject to any
punishment. If any of these conditions was arguably absent, Kent's formula would be no
greater barrier to suppression of such speech than Blackstone's. Neither had attempted to
define appropriate manner, time or place.
95.

T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
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American Law Review." Cooley began his discussion of freedom of
speech by noting that the commentators agreed that the term liberty
of the press was confined to the absence of previous restraints.9 He
even cited Parker in Blanding for that proposition. 8 But Cooley argued that the first amendment should be read more broadly. He first
pointed out that previous restraint was not relevant to oral speech
which clearly cannot be "reviewed" by a censor before "publication"
as can print. Second, he contended that the constitutional phrases
would be a mockery "if, while every man was at liberty to publish
what he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish
him for harmless publications." 99 Cooley suggested that freedom of
speech should be determined by the principles that existed at common law.
[W]e understand liberty of speech and of the press to imply not
only liberty to publish, but complete immunity from legal censure
and punishment for the publication, so long as it is not harmful in
its character, when tested by such standards as the law affords. For
these standards we must look to the common-law rules which were
in force when the constitutional guarantees were established, and in
reference to which they have been adopted. 100
Cooley did not specify which "common-law rules" should be
used as a standard for testing speech, but he did point out one which
he thought should not be used: the common law doctrine of seditious
libel. Cooley recited tersely the history of the Sedition Act, 10 1
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 463 (2d ed. 1871).

96.
97.

6 AM. L. REV. 140 (1871).
"It must be evident from these brief references that liberty of the press, as now

understood and enjoyed, is of very recent origin, and commentators seem to be agreed in the
opinion that the term itself means only that liberty of publication without the previous permission of the government, which was obtained by the abolition of the censorship." T. COOLEY,
supra note 95, at 463-64.
98. Id. at 464.
99. Id. at 465.
100. Id. at 466.
101. Id. at 471-72. The Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes, popularly known as
the Sedition Act, Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798), was one of several repressive measures enacted
that year by a Federalist Congress gripped by fear of war with France and mistrust of foreigners here in the United States. See J. MILLER, supra note 30, at 228-29. See also Naturalization Act, Ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798)(raised the residency requirements for aliens to attain
citizenship from five to fourteen years and required reports and certificates proving compliance); Alien Enemies Act, Ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798)(gave power to President during wartime
to imprison or deport citizens of the enemy nation suspected of aiding the enemy without
having to accord normal procedural due process rights); Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat.
570 (1798)(gave power to President during peacetime to imprison or deport aliens suspected of
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stressing its subsequent rejection. 0 2 He then argued that libels on
the system of government are inconsistent with the principle that the
people frame their own system of government. 10 3 In short, Cooley's
view of free speech, if Holmes had taken note of it, would have appeared a clear repudiation of Blackstone.
Holmes' review of Cooley's work, however, did not even mention
this treatment of freedom of speech. Instead, Holmes commented on

the discussion of the police power in the book-"powers of which,
'the framers of the Constitution could not, as men of ordinary prudence and foresight, have intended to prohibit the exercise in the

particular case, notwithstanding the language of the prohibition
would otherwise include it.'

"104

In addition, Cooley's book did not

cause Holmes to alter or add to the notes on liberty of the press in
his edition of Kent's Commentaries.10 5 Holmes' reaction to Cooley's

discussion of free speech is thus a subject for speculation.
Holmes may not have been impressed by Cooley's view of
speech because that view had little practical importance at the time.

Since the Alien and Sedition Acts had expired over half a century
earlier, the federal government had made no attempt to proscribe

seditious libel, or any speech for that matter. 06 On the state level,
the principles of the common law only allowed for the punishment of

speech "of a pernicious tendency."107 In short, the "bogeyman" of
being dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States).
The Sedition Act prescribed heavy fines and imprisonment for writing, publishing, or
speaking anything of "a false, scandalous and malicious nature" against the government or
any of its officers, I Stat. 596. While never declared unconstitutional, the Sedition Act, as well
as the other repressive Federalist laws, were harshly criticized and, once Jefferson became
President in 1800 concurrent with the downfall of the Federalist Party, were repealed. See T.
COOLEY, supra note 96, at 471. In fact, part of the criticism inspired by the passage of these
Acts was in the form of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
102. T. COOLEY, supra note 95, at 471-72.
103. Id. at 471-74.
104. 6 AM. L. REV. at 141-42 (1871). This attitude towards the police power suggests
disbelief that government would deliberately prevent itself from dealing with undesirable conduct (or speech). This would apply to state constitutional provisions, but it might not apply
with equal force to the first amendment where states retain the power to deal with undesirable
speech.
105. Compare volume 1 of the 10th edition (1860) edited by McCurdy and Forman, at
631-41 with volume 2 of the 12th edition edited by Holmes at 16-26. On the other hand, when
Cooley edited the 4th edition of Story, he added a long running footnote denying Story's affirmation of Blackstone. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 613-14 n.2 (4th ed. T. M. Cooley ed. 1873).
106. See T. COOLEY, supra note 95, at 471.
107. See J. Story, supra note 50, at 670.
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punishment for "harmless publications" feared by Cooley would
have seemed, to Holmes, simply a bad dream. Cooley set forth no
instances of unconstitutional state laws and cited no authority for his
argument.
In addition to his exposure to scholarly views of free speech,
Holmes was, during this period, involved in the study of various
schools of philosophical thought. For example, at the instigation of
his friend William James, Holmes joined with James, Chauncey
Wright, Charles Peirce, Nicholas St. John Green, and Joseph
Warner, to form the Metaphysical Club-a loose association of individuals who met for regular discussions of philosophical matters.108
Holmes was the first to drop out of the group's discussions as his
focus on the law consumed his energy and drew him away from general philosophical discussions.' 0 9 Nevertheless, his participation in
the Club exposed him to a philosophy-pragmatism-which, some
commentators have argued, was later adopted by Holmes as the ba10
sis for his legal philosophy.
An adequate exegesis of the philosophy of pragmatism is, quite
clearly, beyond the scope of this article; it will suffice, for now, to
define pragmatism as the belief that through scientific experimentation and observation of external phenomena man could define and
understand the conceptual world around him. One member of the
Metaphysical Club-Charles S. Peirce--defined pragmatism as follows: "'Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical
bearing you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then
your conception of those effects is the WHOLE of your conception
of the object.' ""' Perhaps the easiest way to understand pragmatism is to view it as the philosophical offshoot of the rise of the scientific method during the late 1800's, with the concomitant belief that
the only truth was that which could be proven experimentally,
2
through observation and cataloguing of external phenomena ."
108.

Fisch, Was there a Metaphysical Club in Cambridge,in STUDIES IN THE PHILOSO2d series (Moore and Robin, eds. 1964).

PHY OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE,

109. Id. at 11, 12.
110. See B. KUKLICK, THE RISE OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUs~rrs 1860-1930 47-50 (1977); Fisch, Justice Holmes, The Prediction Theory of Law, and

Pragmatism, 39 J. OF PHIL. 85, 88 (1942); Note, Holmes, Peirce and Legal Pragmatism. 84
YALE L.J. 1123 (1975). Whether the views of his friends in the Club influenced his views is
not certain. Mark DeWolfe Howe suggested their source lay in Holmes' personal critical examination of Austin. See 2 M. HowE, supra note 37, at 75-76.
111. Peirce, What Pragmatism Is, (1905), reprinted in C. S. PEIRCE, SELECTED WRITINGS 181, 192 (P. Wiener ed. 1958).
112. See C. S. PEIRCE, supra note 111, at x (editor's introduction).
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The pragmatist view of free speech, if one could call it that, was
set out in an essay written by Peirce entitled "The Fixation of Belief, 11 13 to which Holmes was apparently exposed while in the
Club.114 Peirce examined and rejected several ways in which an idea
or belief could become accepted as true, including what he called the
method of authority-namely, through "an institution . . . which

shall have for its object to keep correct doctrines before the attention
of the people.

. .

having at the same time power to prevent contrary

doctrines from being taught, advocated, or expressed."' 15 Peirce preferred "the method of science."1 " Applied to ideas, this method
would begin with doubt about the validity of a certain idea; this
would be followed by a period of testing and experimentation, what
Pierce termed "the struggle to attain belief," and would only end
some new information was
when doubt was laid to rest, at least until
117
presented that would cause new doubt.
One can easily see the parallel between Peirce's period of experimentation and Mill's belief that free speech was necessary to allow
correction of wrong opinions and ideas, 1 s a parallel Holmes surely
recognized. Another philosophical view that was closely related to
Peirce's pragmatism, and which can easily be adapted to support
free speech, is that of Social Darwinism," 9 the belief that the superior cultural, social or idealogical system is that which, like the biological species in Darwin's work, 20 survives the struggle for life.' 2 '
This adaptation of Darwin's theory, like Peirce's pragmatism, had its
roots in the scientific revolution of the late nineteenth century; both
were attempts to transfer the perceived superiorities of the scientific
method to the search for philosophical truth. 22 Social Darwinism,
like pragmatism, can be used to buttress the argument for free
speech-ideas, like biological entities, should be free to struggle, unfettered by suppression, in the community, with those ideas that gain
popular acceptance deemed to be the "survivors" and thus superior.
113. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief (1877), reprintedin C. S.
at 92.
114. See Note, supra note 110, at 1125.

PEIRCE,

supra note 111,

115.

C. S. PIERCE, supra note 111, at 103.

116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 107.
Id. at 99-101.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See generally H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (abridged and revised ed. 1892).

120.

C.

DARWIN,

ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL

(1859).
121. H. SPENCER, supra note 119, at 365.
122. See C. S. PEIRCE, supra note 111, at x (editor's introduction).
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That Holmes was strongly influenced by Darwinist thought during
the period is beyond doubt; 2 ' an article he wrote for the American
Law Review in 1873 is filled with references to Darwinist social
struggle: "The struggle for life, undoubtedly, is constantly putting
the interests of men at variance with those of the lower animals. And
the struggle does not stop in the ascending scale with the monkeys,
but is equally the law of human existence.' 24
Holmes' exposure during this period of his life, to a number of
philosophical viewpoints that seem to militate in favor of free speech
does not, however, mean that Holmes viewed them as such. For one
thing, philosophical ideals can be easily bent in practice to support
either position in an argument. Darwinism, for example, can be used
as support for the notion that government should have the power to
suppress dissenting ideas; if one views the actions of a representative
government as the expression of the will of the people, government
suppression of a minority viewpoint may be seen as the victory in a
Darwinian struggle of the viewpoint of the majority.
Perhaps more important is the realization that Holmes may
have wholeheartedly accepted the notion that free speech in the abstract was desirable while at the same time supporting the government's power to supress it, right or wrong. After all, despite his apparent fascination with Darwinist theory, 5 it was Holmes who, as a
Supreme Court Justice, would later assert that "[t]he Fourteenth
123. See Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 719, 739-40 (1982).

124. 7 Am. L. REV. 582, 583 (1873). In the article, Holmes expressed doubt that the
legislative model conformed as well to Darwinist theory as Spencer had suggested. Id. But his
doubts were chiefly aimed at short-run conformity; as he put it, "legislation . . .like every
other device of man or beast, must tend in the long run to aid the survival of the fittest." Id.
Years later, Holmes expressed the hope that the struggle would, in the long run, succeed

in raising man to new heights:
If I feel what are perhaps an old man's apprehensions, that competition from

new races will cut deeper than workingmen's disputes and will test whether we can
band together and fight; if I fear that we are running through the world's resources
at a pace that we cannot keep; I do not lose my hopes. I do not pin my dreams for

the future to my country or even to my race. I think it probable that civilization
somehow will last as long as I care to look ahead-perhaps with smaller numbers,
but perhaps also bred to greatness and splendor by science. I think it not improbable
that man, like the grub that prepares a chamber for the winged thing it never has

seen but is to be-that man may have cosmic destinies that he does not understand.
And so beyond the vision of battling races and an impoverished earth I catch a

dreaming glimpse of peace.
Holmes, "Speech at a dinner of the Harvard Law School Association of New York on February 15, 1913" in O.W. HOLMES, SPEECHES (1913).
125. See supra notes 123, 124.
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Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."128 Holmes had already seen how idealistic theories of free
speech could be consistently linked with the admission that constitutional free speech guarantees were only intended by their framers to
guard against prior restraint.12 7 In short, it would be erroneous to
attribute Holmes' eventual embrace of broad free speech protection
to his legal philosophies; it would be equally erroneous to dismiss the
notion that those philosophies had an effect because of Holmes' adherence to Blackstone 128 while a judge on the highest court in Massachusetts, to which he was appointed in 1882.
In his new judicial role, Holmes had only occasionally to deal
with problems of free speech, and even then it was under the Massachusetts constitutional provision which Chief Judge
Parker had nar1 29
rowly construed in Commonwealth v. Blanding
VI.

HOLMES AND SPEECH CASES ON THE MASSACHUSETTS
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

A few years after he came to the bench, Holmes decided a case
in which he made direct reference to the Blanding decision. In Cowley v. Pulsifer,130 the plaintiff sued a newspaper for libel. The paper
had merely reported on the filing of a petition for removal of a lawyer from the bar, but the contents of that petition were libelous in
the absence of a privilege. The parties did not appear to argue that
the case was controlled by any provision of the state constitution."' 1
Instead, the defendant argued that reports of the commencement of
legal proceedings were privileged publications under the common
law. 3 2 In response to this argument, Holmes cited Commonwealth v.
Blanding for the proposition that accusations of misconduct are not
privileged communications unless made in a legal proceeding. The
filing of the petition for removal was privileged, Holmes reasoned,
but the published report of its contents served as a public accusation
126. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
127. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
128. Cf. supra note 78.
129. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825).
130. 137 Mass. 392 (1884). "Early in my judicial experience I wrote a decision on the
extent of the privilege in publishing legal proceedings, Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (in
1884). 1 remember that The Nation pitched into it and don't remember much else." Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock (December 15, 1912), reprinted in I
HOLMES-POLLOcK LETTERS 204 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
131. 137 Mass. at 392-93.
132. Id. at 393.
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and was thus not similarly privileged. 33 In other words, a newspaper
might be privileged to report on the proceedings at a trial in which
defendent had an opportunity to make his defense, but a report of
the petition alone was not fair treatment. Holmes, like Parker before
him, saw the law as attempting to civilize disputes by confining them
within the established bounds of a legal proceeding.
Holmes referred to Blanding with approval again just two years
later, citing it in Bigelow v. Sprague3 4 for the proposition that each
separate copy of a publication can be used to sustain an indictment.
Although Bigelow was a libel suit, no argument concerning freedom
of speech was made. Thus, on the Massachusetts bench, Holmes, as
he did in law school and in his work on Kent's Commentaries,
turned to Parker's opinion in Blanding, and never in a context in
which the old Chief Justice's interpretation of the meaning of freedom of the press was challenged.
It is not surprising that, for Holmes, the speech related issues
that arose on the Massachusetts bench were set in a framework established by Parker's opinion in Blanding. The first amendment did
not apply to the states, and no one on the Supreme Court was ready
yet to apply it through the mediating device of the fourteenth
amendment. 135 For this reason, the great antifederalist demands for
first amendment protection of speech and the history of the treatment of the Alien and Sedition Acts by Jefferson were irrelevant to
Holmes while he sat on the Massachusetts bench. It was the meaning of the state, not the federal, constitution which was at issue for
Holmes and that meaning had been settled for more than half a
century.
From this framework, a striking departure from the judicial
consensus over the meaning of the phrases in the Massachusetts constitution would have been a great leap for Holmes to make. It would
have required him to pit the state Supreme Judicial Court against
precedent taught to Holmes as dogma in law school and reinforced
as "the law" throughout his early legal career. Despite his previous
exposure to various views on freedom of speech as an ideal during
his early years, Holmes was never seriously prodded into abandoning
"the law" to make that leap.
Later speech cases did not directly confront Holmes with the
133. Id.
134. 140 Mass. 425 (1886).
135. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Holmes finessed the issue when it

first arose during his tenure on the Supreme Court. See infra text accompanying notes 150-55.
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prospect of reconsidering Blanding. For example, in McAuliffe v.
New Bedford,131 a policeman was discharged for participating in a
political campaign contrary to city rules. Holmes, without direct reference to any free speech considerations, held the discharge justified
for violation of a reasonable condition of employment. His colorful
phrase, however, was invoked later by others for more serious invasions of speech: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. "137
Believing, as the Supreme Court still does today, 138 that it was wholly appropriate to keep public servants from engaging actively in partisan politics, Holmes seized upon a deceptive principle and a brilliant phrase to justify the result in McAuliffe. He did so in a way
that enabled him to avoid any direct consideration of the validity of
the constitutional interpretation in Blanding.
In another speech related case, Commonwealth v. Davis,139
Holmes affirmed a conviction for speaking without a permit in a
public park.1 40 The argument that the permit requirement under the
ordinance is unconstitutional, said Holmes, "involves the same kind
of fallacy that was dealt with in McAuliffe v. New Bedford. . . . It
assumes that the ordinance is directed against free speech generally
. . .whereas in fact it is directed toward the modes in which Boston
Common may be used." 141 Once again Holmes decided a speech related case without having to consider the wisdom of Blanding.
Holmes' tenure on the Massachusetts bench lasted over twenty
years. Thus, by the time he was appointed to the Supreme Court of

the United States in 1902,142he had spent over twenty years on the
highest court of a state where the leading case on freedom of
speech 143 adopted a view-Blackstone's-that he had been taught as
136. 155 Mass. 216 (1892).
137. Id. at 220.
138. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (upholding a state statute restricting the political activities of civil servants).
139. 162 Mass. 510 (1895).
140. Id.at 513.
141. Id. at 511. The Court had previously upheld the ordinance against a challenge of
unequal administration. Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57 (1892).
142.

See F. Biddle, supra note 27, at 101. Holmes seemed, at the time, ready and will-

ing to put the past behind him: "The work of the past seems a finished book-locked up far
away, and a new and solemn volume opens." Holmes to Pollock (December 28, 1902), reprinted in I HOLMES-POLLOCK LmrrERs 109 (M. Howe ed. 1941). But the past stayed with
him in understanding freedom of speech until 1919.
143. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825). See supra notes 64-67
and accompanying text.
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dogma in law school, 1 4 and had seen treated as such thereafter. 145
And in all those years on the bench Holmes had heard no effective
challenge to the familiar doctrine as law;"46 any inconsistent idealis1 47
tic or philosophical viewpoints he had been previously exposed to
had, no doubt, faded into the background, pushed aside by a judge's
duty
to, as Chief Justice Marshall once put it, "say what the law
, '14 8
is.

Holmes' first experience with a speech case as a Supreme Court
Justice failed, for reasons examined in the following section to provide him with any real opportunity or impetus to deviate from the
pattern established in Massachusetts. An examination of this case
will provide an interesting contrast to the later analysis of the Espionage Act cases,14 9 where a Holmes prepared by critical abandonment of Blackstone was effectively convinced to reconsider his view
of free speech.
VII.

HOLMES ON THE SUPREME COURT:

Patterson

The first speech case presented to Holmes as a Supreme Court
Justice was decided in 1907, just five years after he joined the Court.
Patterson v. Colorado5 " was a contempt case brought against exSenator Patterson for an editorial and article written by him that
severely criticized a Colorado Supreme Court decision invalidating
elections held in Denver. "What next?" the editorial demanded. "If
somebody will let us know what next the utility corporations of Denver and the political machine they control will demand the question
will be answered."1 51 Other articles by Patterson suggested that the
Colorado Supreme Court decision was just the first step towards a
final decision that would free the utility companies from restrictions
on their franchises. 5 The contempt charge brought by the state attorney general alleged that the articles described above affected
pending matters before the judiciary since the decided cases were
still subject to a petition for rehearing and the articles made refer144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See supra notes 50-74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58-60, 69-71, 78-82, 96-103, 113-24 and accompanying text.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
See infra notes 252-300, and accompanying text.
205 U.S. 454 (1907).
People v. New-Times Publishing Company, 35 Colo. 253 (1906).
Id. at 257-75.
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ence to a course of decision in cases that had not been heard.15 Patterson's defense was that the intimations of the articles were all
based on fact.154 His answer proceeded to detail a scandalous scheme
by the utility corporations to buy control of Colorado, including the
"purchase" of the appointment of two of the judges of the state supreme court before whom the contempt charge was to be heard.155
Not surprisingly, the Colorado court refused to permit Patterson to
prove the allegations contained in his answer. It found that truth was
irrelevant as a defense where a defendant is charged with out of
court comments tending to influence the outcome of pending
matters. 156
In state court, Patterson had argued, inter alia, that his comments were protected by Article II, section 10 of the Colorado Constitution which provided:
No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any
subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; and that in
all suits and prosecutions for libel the truth thereof may be given in
evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact.157
Patterson also included a claim that the contempt charge violated his
rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.""
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the bulk of Patterson's argument was devoted to the proposition that the due process clause of the federal Constitution was violated by incorrect state
interpretations of state common law and the state constitution. Patterson's free speech argument under the fourteenth amendment also
appeared to be based on the theory that the due process clause was
violated by the state court misinterpretation of the state constitution.
This discussion emphasized that truth was a defense under the Colorado Constitution and repeated almost exactly the language of the
state constitutional provision in defining the free speech right
153. Id. at 275-77.
154. Id. at 283.
155. Id, at 284-351.
156. Id. at 393.
157. COLORAOO CONST. art. II § 10. See People v. New-Times Publishing Company, 35
Colo. at 279.
158. 35 Colo. at 279.
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In attempting to also find a federal right to be free of state impairment of free speech independent of any state constitutional guarantees, Patterson did not rely on any enumerated constitutional protection, retreating instead to the vagueness of the ninth amendment:
[T]his right of any person to rely upon the truth of what he has
alleged, is one which was established with our government, and as
a part of our free institutions. . . . This right, as we believe, is
independent of the expressed constitutional recognition given, and
while in some form or other it has been embedded in the constitution of every state of the Union, and in the Constitution of the
United States, it would doubtless be held to be included in those
general rights not specifically named
in the constitution, which are
1 0
reserved by and to the people.

6

As a result of Patterson's primary reliance on the language of the
Colorado Constitution that provided truth was a defense to libel, he
felt no need to go beyond it to argue either the history or meaning of
the first amendment to the United States Constitution. At this point,
based solely on the petitioner's brief, the Court could have dismissed
the case for want of federal jurisdiction without mentioning freedom
of speech. It could have pointed out that the federal courts have no
power to review state court interpretations of state law and that petitioner had failed to claim that any specific provision of the federal
Constitution was violated in any other manner.
Justice Harlan's dissent, however, avoided the easy escape
route. Outraged by what appeared to be a high-handed cover-up of
evildoing, Harlan insisted that the Colorado court had violated Patterson's free speech rights as embodied in the privileges and immunities and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.16 1 This
159. While any person may say what he pleases of or concerning any other person
or institution, yet the law makes him responsible for exercising this right, but it
must be kept clearly in mind that one is punished solely for an abuse of the liberty
of speech, or the abuse of the liberty of the press.
Brief for Plantiff-in-Error at 88, Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). See supra note
157 and accompanying text.
160. Id. at 87-88. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. IX. Reliance on the ninth amendment was,
and still is, a very weak basis for constitutional limitations. Even Justice Goldberg's concurrence, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) conceded that the ninth amendment
created no rights. At most it recognizes the existence of rights which may be enforceable
against the states through the fourteenth amendment. In addition, the suggestion that somehow freedom of speech was a right beyond any specific constitutional mention would have had
no appeal to Holmes. See Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1918).
161. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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was a novel argument, and Harlan cited neither history nor precedent to support it. Harlan's theory was not clearly set forth by the
petitioner, so it is not surprising to find that there was also neither
history nor supporting precedent in the petitioner's brief. Harlan laid
down no test for free speech, noting only that it was violated. "In my
judgment the action of the court below was in violation of the rights
'6 2
of free speech and a free press as guaranteed by the Constitution. 1
Holmes, assigned to write the opinion of the Court, had the task
of responding to Harlan's contentions, which surely offended Holmes
as examples of Harlan's usual high-handedness. 6 3 Holmes would
surely have preferred to dismiss Harlan's fourteenth amendment argument by simply asserting that the due process clause did not impose substantive limits on the states, a position he had espoused since
his early days on the Court.1 Had he taken this tack, however,
Holmes would have been unable to receive the support of the Court;
much to his chagrin, they had shown no reluctance to read their conceptions of justice and "natural rights" into the due process
clause.1 65 Yet Holmes hesitated to make a statement that might be
162. Id. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
163. "[Tlhat sage, although a man of real power, did not shine either in analysis or
generalization and I never troubled myself much when he shied. I used to say that he had a
powerful vise the jaws of which couldn't be got nearer than two inches to each other." Letter
from Holmes to Pollock (April 5, 1919), reprinted in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 7-8 (M.
Howe ed. 1941). See F. BIDDLE, supra note 27, at I11.
164. "I like to multiply my skepticisms as against the judicial tendency to read into a
Constitution class prejudices naively imagined to be eternal laws." Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein, (June 12, 1906) reprinted in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LrrEs
23 (J. Peabody ed. 1964), Holmes' dissents in a number of cases involving due process limits
on state power to reveal his belief that his brethren had imposed their version of "eternal
laws." The most notable of these is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905). (Holmes,
J., dissenting). Later dissents in this vein were Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), and
Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
165. Holmes' objection to using the fourteenth amendment as his brethren had went
deeper than a simple belief that the drafters of the amendment had not intended it to be used
that way. It had its roots in Holmes' skepticism about the existence of any "natural" or "fundamental" rights which transcend government or the will of the people. In a famous law review article Holmes explained this skepticism:
But for legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophey-the imagination
of a substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought to bear upon
those who do things said to contravene it-just as we talk of the force of gravitation
accounting for the conduct of bodies in space. One phrase adds no more than the
other to what we know without it. No doubt behind these legal rights is the fighting
will of the subject to maintain them, and the spread of his emotions to the general
rules by which they are maintained; but that does not seem to me the same thing as
the supposed a priori discernment of a duty or the assertion of a preexisting right. A
dog will fight for his bone.
The most fundamental of the supposed preexisting rights-the right to life- is
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viewed as a retreat from his traditional narrow reading of the fourteenth amendment. He decided, therefore, to finesse the problem,
and satisfy his more activist brethren, by arguing that the most extreme position on incorporating the first amendment would still give
no protection to Patterson:
We leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in
the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the
First. But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and
freedom of the press were protected from abridgment on the part
not only of the United States but also of the States, still we should
be far from the conclusion that the plaintiff in error would have us
reach."' 8
In interpreting the first amendment, Holmes was deciding a
point that the parties had not briefed. Harlan's conclusory statements offered neither history nor precedent in support. Thus,
Holmes, with no cogent argument to the contrary available, engrafted on the first amendment the interpretation with which he was
familiar under Massachusetts law. "In the first place," he wrote,
"the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is to 'prevent all
sacrificed without a scruple not only in war, but whenever the interest of society,
that is, of the predominant power in the community, is thought to demand it.
Whether that interest is the interest of mankind in the long run no one can tell.
Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918). Many of the expressions in this
passage were contained in two letters to Felix Frankfurter in November of 1915:
I say Law in Books is merely Sibylline leaves of prophecy as to when the public
force will be brought to bear on you through the Courts. (See Amer. Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co. 213 U.S. 347, 356). And a statement about rights is merely a part
of those prophecies-The talk about rights is what I believe the philosophers call a
hypostasis of the prophecy. If you don't want to mix up law with morals &c., (as
you may, qua philosopher, but may not qua lawyer,) you should approach it with a
cynical mind-be a bad man-and say I don't care a damn about your approval.or
disapproval. All I want to know is what will happen (through the Courts) if I do so
and so.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (November 4, 1915), Box 29, Folder
3, Holmes Papers (Manuscript Division, Harvard Law School Library).
What I wrote yesterday ought to have been condensed by me into a single
orphic saying-A duty is the hypostasis of a prophecy. Which I hereby copyright
right with you.
P.S. So, Force is the hypostasis of the prophecy that "Bodies" will behave to
each other in a certain way-or more accurately that phenomena will have a certain
sequence. It adds nothing-and intelligent men of science know that it adds nothing.
Id.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (November 5, 1915), id.
166. Patterson,205 U.S. at 462.
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such previous restraintsupon publications as had been practiced by
other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punish1 67
ment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare."
To the familiar cite to Blanding, he added Respublica v. Oswald, 8
a contempt case in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in response to a free speech claim by the defendant, adopted the "no
prior restraints" view of Blackstone. In the absence of any attempt
by the parties to seriously question either case, or the rule they
adopted, it is not surprising that Holmes fell back on the familiar
doctrine.10 9
Holmes was not again confronted with a free speech claim until
eight years after Patterson,and even then only in a case where virtually no authority was mustered by the claimant against Blackstone's
theory. In Fox v. Washington,17 0 the appellant had been convicted of
violating a state statute proscribing the printing of material encouraging or advocating disrespect for law. He had written an editorial
entitled "The Nude and the Prudes" that criticized the arrest of
some nude bathers for indecent exposure.' 7 ' The fine imposed by the
167. Id.
168. 1 U.S. (I Dail.) 319 (1788).
169. Id. See Patterson v. Colorado, Brief of Defendant-In-Error at 15-16 (quoting
Respublica).
That Respublica would have appeared to Holmes a strong statement in support of Blackstone cannot be doubted:
The true liberty of the press is amply secured by permitting every man to publish
his opinion; but it is due to the peace and dignity of society to inquire into the
motives of such publications, and to distinguish between those which are meant for
use and reformation, and with an eye solely to the public good, and those which are
intended merely to delude and defame.
Respublica v. Oswald, I U.S. (1 DalI.) at 325.
The strong reaction against the Respublica opinion-the contempt conviction upheld was
based solely on one newspaper article protesting the publisher's recent conviction for libel, and
the justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were nearly impeached as a result of the
case-should, one can argue, have weakened its precedential value in Holmes' eyes.
On the assumption that Holmes read the case in Dallas, he would have seen the long note
by the reporter on the subsequent attempt to impeach the justices who decided Oswald. One
view of this event is that it evidences a general dissatisfaction with the restrictive view of the
state court on guarantees of liberty of the press.
However, the other perspective notes that the impeachment failed, and would conclude
that the legislature agreed with the judge's view of the Constitution. Given Holmes' position in
trying to avoid Harlan's incorporation without losing the rest of the court, he surely was not
looking to draw out adverse inferences from a footnote to the only case which either party
cited that could be found in the Supreme Court reports. (Dallas mixed both Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court decisions in these early volumes. It was a
sensible procedure, since the U.S. Court did very little appellate business in its first years).
170. 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
171. Id. at 276.
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state trial court was small,17 2 and the record and briefs in the case
were almost as scanty as the bather's attire. The appellant included
an argument that the first amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press were part of the liberty protected by
the fourteenth amendment; 173 his main argument, however, was
based on the vagueness of the statute, 17 4 and there was no treatment
in his brief of the history or purposes of the first amendment.
Holmes indicated some sympathy with Fox, but upheld the statute
as a valid regulation of speech deemed contrary to public morals:
"[B]y indirection but unmistakably the article encourages and incites a persistence in what we must assume would be a breach of the
state laws against indecent exposure; and the jury so found. ' 75
In short, Holmes' concern with the first amendment through
Fox was peripheral. He had been taught Blackstone's definition in
law school, he had practiced in a state that had adopted it as the
meaning of its constitution, and his encounters with free speech
problems in both the Massachusetts court system and United States
Supreme Court had not exposed him to an effective historical critique of that position. Given his belief that the law should be in harmony with the desires of the dominant community in order to survive, it is thus not surprising that, through 1915 and Fox, he had
accepted a definition of free speech that was, as far as Holmes could
tell, the prevailing dogma. Philosophy and ideal to the contrary had
yet to be shown to Holmes as a viable legal position. Soon, however,
all that would change.
VIII.

THEORY AND LAW BEGIN TO MERGE

Little as I believe in it [freedom of speech] as a theory I hope I

would die for it and I go as far as anyone whom
I regardas com6
petent to form an opinion, in favor of it.1 7
As Justice Holmes entered his seventies after a decade on the
Supreme Court, he added a new circle of friends. His skepticism regarding current truths and tolerance of new experiments as well as
his wit, brilliant conversation and philosophical bent, made him at172. See State v. Fox, 127 P. 1111, 1112 (Wash. 1912).

173. Brief of Plaintiff-in-Error at 17, Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
174. Id. at 7-17.
175. See 236 U.S. at 277.
176. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold J.Laski (October 26, 1919)
reprinted in 1 HoLmEs-LAsKI LmrnERs 217 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
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tractive to bright young liberals. 17 7 In turn, Holmes was drawn by
their youth, their enthusiasm and their intelligence. In 1910 he had
sent for Herbert Croly's The Promise of American Life,17 8 and by
1914 he had become fast friends with Croly and Walter Lippman. 17 9
The same year, Croly and Lippman were among the founders of The
New Republic, to which Holmes promptly subscribed. 180 Several
years later, he wrote Lewis Einstein:
Do you see the New Republic? It is rather solemn for my
taste; but the young men who write in it are, some of them, friends
of mine, which doesn't prevent an occasional, flattering reference to
this old man, and I get great pleasure from our occasional talks.
They put me on to books that they think will be good for me, and
please me by their latent or expressed enthusiasm, and their talent.
But I fear they would be empty names to you. Frankfurter (Professor at Harvard Law School), Walter Lippman, Croly, Laski, etc. 8 1
The New Republic group, Holmes wrote Pollock, "make much
of your venerable uncle and not only so, but by bringing an atmosphere of intellectual freedom in which one can breathe, make life to
him a good deal more pleasant."1 82
This delight in his new friendships does not, of course, indicate
that Holmes accepted all the views of his new friends without question. The work of Laski, for example, moved towards socialism, and
others in the group pressed towards nationalization of large business
enterprises; 83 this hardly accorded with Holmes' ideals.1 8 4 They did,
177. "[]t is that willingness to experiment which is the basis of his hold over the radical
mind." Laski, Mr. Justice Holmes HARPER MAGAZINE (March 1930), reprintedin MR. JusTIcE HOLMES 153 (F. Frankfurter ed. 1931); see also Lippman, To Justice Holmes on his
Seventy-Fifth Birthday, 6 NEw REPUBLIC 156 (1916), reprinted in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES,
165-67 (F. Frankfurter ed. 1931). "In him wisdom has lost its austerity and becomes a tumbling succession of imagery and laughter and outrage." Id. at 166.
178. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (July 23, 1910),
reprinted in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS 54 (J.P. Peabody ed. 1964).
179. Letter from Holmes to Einstein (December 10, 1914), reprinted in id. at 102.
180, "He [Lippman] and Croly, one of the strongest of the young men,. . . are going to
start a weekly, The New Republic, to which I have subscribed with hope." Letter from Holmes
to Pollock (November 7, 1914), reprintedin 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 225 (M. Howe ed.
1941).
181. Letter from Holmes to Einstein (August 12, 1916), reprintedin THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LErTERS 136 (J.P. Peabody ed. 1964).
182, Letter from Holmes to Pollock (February 18, 1917), reprinted in I HOLMES-POLLOCK LrTERS 244 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
183. See generally C. FORcEY, THE CROSSROADS OF LIBERAUISM: CROLY, WEYL, LIPPMAN AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1900-1925 (1961).
184. "I do have a vague apprehension that what you and I think the finest ideals and
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however, place their faith in participatory democracy while remaining fully aware of its problems.18 5 Holmes' friends from the New
Republic called attention to perceived abuses of free speech that accompanied the United States' entrance into World War 1 86-- an editorial strongly opposed the 1918 Amendment to the Espionage
Act 18 7-- but strongly supported the entrance itself.
Although Holmes paid more attention to the book reviews than
to the editorials, his delight in the young men must have led to numerous conversations with them on civil liberties. One such conversation with a member of the New Republic group, Judge Learned
Hand,188 is reflected in a series of letters. This exchange holds particular interest for several reasons: (i) It is one of the few records of
Justice Holmes discussing free speech prior to the Espionage Act
cases; (ii) it was written in the summer before those cases came to
the Court; (iii) it echoed discussions of the English utilitarians with
whom Holmes was familiar from almost half a century earlier; and
(iv) Learned Hand's opinion in Masses v. Patten was the key authority for the arguments of the defendants in two of the Espionage
Act cases in the spring of 1919.119
In July of 1917, Learned Hand had enjoined the postmaster of
New York from excluding the August issue of The Masses magazine
from the mails.19 0 Although articles in the magazine condemned the
war and praised individuals who took vigorous measures in opposition to it,191 Hand found that it did not violate the Espionage Act of
interests may be, I won't say swept away, but dimmed and diminished by the coarsely materialistic ones that are behind so much of what presents itself with spiritual claims: socialism,
pacificism, etc." Letter from Holmes to Einstein (February 10, 1918), reprinted in THE
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LtrwE.s 161 (J. P. Peabody ed. 1964).
185. See generally H. CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY (1914); W. LIPPMAN, Diwr
AND MASTERY (1914).
186. See, e.g., Dewey, In Explanationof Our Lapse, 13 NEw REPuBLIC 17, November
3, 1917; Hard, Traitor, 13 NEw REPuBLIc 95-98, November 24, 1917; 14 NEw REPUBLIc 91
(editorial, February 23, 1918).
187. 15 NEw REPUBLIC 65-66 (editorial, May 18, 1918): "IT]he bill itself brings one
institution into disrepute that has always been most highly valued, and which has always been
considered characteristically American-the institution of freedom of speech."
188. See C. FORCEY, supra note 183, at 181 (discussing Hand's ties to the New
Republic.)
189. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.
1917), cited in Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 7, 12-13, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919); Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 71, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
190. Masses Publishing Company v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24
(2d. Cir. 1917).
191. Id. at 543-45.
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1917. "12 That act forbade causing insubordination in the military
forces or obstructing the recruiting service. 193 Hand held that the
Act was not violated by speech unless the speaker urged others that
it was their duty or in their interest to violate the Act. 94
195
To Hand's regret, the Second Circuit reversed his decision.
The reversal emphasized the scope of the postmaster's discretion, but
it also substituted a new standard-whether the natural and reasonable effect of speech was to encourage resistance to a law by words
used in an endeavor to persuade to resistance.1 96 As Hand foresaw,
the court of appeals standard made it possible for lower courts to
more easily suppress speech, since an intent to persuade could be
19 7
presumed from the tendency of the words to encourage resistance.
A further step to facilitate suppression of speech was taken in
May of 1918 when Congress amended the Espionage Act 198 to include, inter alia, prohibitions against using disloyal, scurrilous and
abusive language about the form of government of the United States
and against using language intended to bring the form of government of the United States into contempt.19 9 Thus, in the summer of
192. Id. at 542-45.
193. Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 § 3:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false
reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of
the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its
enemies and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or
attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or
enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United
States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for
not more than twenty years, or both.
194. Masses, 244 F. at 540, rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
195. 246 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
196. "If the natural and reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage resistance to a
law, and the words are used in an endeavor to persuade to resistance, it is immaterial that the
duty to resist is not mentioned, or the interest of the persons addressed in resistance is not
suggested." Id. at 38.
197. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 50-60 (1941).
198. Ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
199. The amendment, Id., added the following to section 3 of the 1917 Act, supra note
193:
(a]nd whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write,
or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of
government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the
military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the
uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States, or any language intended to
bring the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the
United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the
United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States into con-
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1918, Judge Hand was witness to the spread of the sort of suppres-

sion he had feared, and he may have brooded about his country's
disregard for freedom of speech as he took the train home for a
vacation.
His companion for a portion of that train trip was Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes was vaguely aware of
the prosecution of socialists and radicals under the Espionage Act,200

but no case involving issues of free speech under that Act had yet
reached the Court. We do not know the exact nature of the conver-

sation between Hand and Holmes on the train journey, but a letter
from Hand sent soon after appears to re-create a portion of it. "I
gave up rather more easily than I now feel disposed about Tolerance

on Wednesday," wrote Hand. 20 1 The discussion aboard the train
may have begun as speculation about the bases for tolerance-the

willingness to accomodate opposing viewpoints 2 2 -sparked at least
tempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute, or shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish
any language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United
States, or to promote the cause of its enemies, or shall willfully display the flag of
any foreign enemy, or shall willfully by utterance, writing, printing, publication, or
language spoken, urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of production in this
country of any thing or things, product or products, necessary or essential to the
prosecution of the war in which the United States may be engaged, with intent by
such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the prosecution of the
war, and whoever shall willfully advocate, teach, defend, or suggest the doing of any
of the acts or things in this section enumerated, and whoever shall by word or act
support or favor the cause of any country with which the United States is at war or
by word or act oppose the cause of the United States therein, shall be punished by a
fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
both: Provided,That any employee or official of the United States Government who
commits any disloyal act or utters any unpatriotic or disloyal language, or who, in
an abusive and violent manner criticizes the Army or Navy or the flag of the United
States shall be at once dismissed from the service. Any such employee shall be dismissed by the head of the department in which the employee may be engaged, and
any such official shall be dismissed by the authority having power to appoint a successor to the dismissed official.
200. Holmes was an avid reader of the New Republic which made various mentions of
the suppression incident to the war, see supra note 182. An editorial even referred to the
Masses--"A magazine entitled the Masses edited by Mr. Max Eastman was one of the first
and least necessary casualties of the present war." 14 Naw REPUBuc 93, (February 23,
1918).
201. Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (June 22, 1918), reprinted in Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History 27 STAN. L. Rzv. 719, 755 (1975).
202. Some support for this theory of the initiation of the conversation may be derived
from Laski's letter to Holmes which was written after Holmes had shown Laski the letter from
Hand and presumably recounted the conversation with Hand on the train. Laski treats the
letter from Hand as part of a discussion of the grounding of tolerance in history.
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on Hand's part by reflection on the intolerance pervading the United
States at war. Hand may have argued that tolerance finds its source
in the majority's doubt of its own premises. Holmes may have made
the same point, for it comports exactly with his comments on the
logic of persecution.203
The next step was common ground among the two men-that
man cannot perceive absolute truth. For Holmes, "I mean by truth
simply what I can't help accepting . .

. Therefore I know nothing

about absolute truth." 204 Hand then used their common skepticism
to argue the necessity for tolerance:
Here I take my stand. Opinions are at best provisional hypotheses,
incompletely tested. The more they are tested, after the tests are
well scrutinized, the more assurance we may assume, but they are
never absolutes. So we must be tolerant of opposite opinions or varying opinions by the very fact of our incredulity of our own.20 5

Here then, was virtually the same argument in favor of free speech
Holmes had read in Mill's book years earlier, but this time from a
judge in the midst of dealing with the greatest speech controversy of
His thesis seemed to me acceptable in its result, but not in its method, and allowing
certain difficulties to sneak round the corner instead of being boldly met. I take it
that the history of ideas relative to toleration pass through three clear states; (I)
when the idea eo nomine is criminal and therefore meets persecution e.g. the early
Christians; (II) when the idea itself is not judged criminal but inexpedient, and
persecuted on that ground e.g. the Catholics under Elizabeth; (III) when the idea is
regarded as having sufficient strength or weakness to be permitted survival. Hand
seemed to me in the third stage about most ideas, and so am I. But is any government likely to adopt it? . . .I ought to add that I am sure the real ground for
toleration is the change of perspective. . . . There is an alternative hypothesis that
toleration was a dodge invented by the physically weak to secure survival.
Letter from Laski to Holmes (July 5, 1918), reprinted in I HOLMES-LASKI LETrERS 159-60.
In January of 1919, Laski was still discussing toleration. "'Please look at Volume VI of his
Collected Works,' Laski wrote Holmes of Bagehot, the essay on the 'Metaphysical Basis of
Toleration. I don't know why he uses the word metaphysical; but his is certainly the most
sensible discussion of that business I know.'" Letter from Laski to Holmes (January 29,
1919), reprinted in Id. at 182.
203. "My thesis would be (1) if you are cocksure, and (2) if you want it very much, and
(3) if you have no doubt of your power-you will do what you believe efficient to bring about
what you want-by legislation or otherwise." Letter from Holmes to Laski (July 7, 1918),

reprintedIn 1 HOLMEs-LASKI

LETr RS

160-61. This was a familiar thought for Holmes: "The

other day when I was speaking of the logic of persecution he [C.J. White] agreed but said we,
none of us live logically." O.W. Holmes to Canon Patrick Augustine Sheehan (February,

1904), reprinted In HOLMES-SHEEHAN

CORRESPONDENCE

14 (D. Burton ed. 1976).

204.

Letter from O.W. Holmes to L. Einstein (June 1, 1905), reprintedin THE HOLMESEINSTEIN LETTERS 16 (J.P. Peabody ed. 1964).
205. Letter from Hand to Holmes (June 22, 1918), reprinted in Gunther, supra note
201, at 755.
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his time. Mill had asserted that man is fallible, that to suppress opposing views is to deny this fact, and that "wrong opinions and practices" could be discovered and mistakes rectified only through unlimited free discussion; 20 6 Hand was now similarly saying that opinions
were provisional hypotheses which had to be tested, presumably by
allowing them to compete in an unfettered atmosphere of free discussion.20 7 It is reasonable to assume that, even a half century later,
Holmes would have recalled his early exposure to Mill20 and would
thus have been responsive to Hand's argument on an intellectual
level.
On a more practical level, however, Hand was dealing with a
Holmes who shied away from applying idealistic notions of right and
wrong to the realities of human existence. As has already been discussed, Holmes eschewed the approach of judges, like his Supreme
Court colleagues, who discovered "absolute truths," such as freedom
of contract, in natural law or the Bill of Rights and then wielded
those truths to sweep aside legislation duly enacted by representatives of the majority. 209 He may, therefore, have viewed Hand's invocation of Mill as interesting, and have agreed with it on an intellectual level, while feeling at the same time that Hand was wrong in
trying to enact that theory into law in Masses. That Holmes' disdain
for natural law was still with him in 1918 cannot be doubted; that
summer, the HarvardLaw Review published an article by Holmes in
which he essentially argued that all natural rights were nonsense.21 0
An additional reason why Holmes would not have been entirely
responsive to Hand's free speech argument has to do with its relationship to Mill. While its similarity to Mill may, as has been suggested, 211 have struck a responsive chord in Holmes, it just as surely
reminded Holmes of Stephen's attack on Mill, which he had read at
about the same time as his exposure to Mill.21 2 Stephen's response to
Mill's argument-that society should be aware of its fallibility and
thus tolerate dissenting views213---was to point out that recognition
of the possible correctness of an opposing view does not require an
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1918).
See supra text accompanying note 208.
See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
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individual or a state to tolerate its existence. 1 4 In the same article
that attacked the natural rights concept, Holmes that summer wrote
a sentence that could have come straight from Stephen:
Deep seated preferences can not be argued about-and therefore,
when differences are sufficiently far reaching we try to kill the
other man rather than let him have his way. But that is perfectly
consistent with admitting
that, so far as it appears, his grounds are
215
just as good as ours.

Apparently Holmes said something similar on the train, for Hand
wrote him, "You say that I strike at the sacred right to kill the other
fellow when he disagrees. The horrible possibility silenced me when
you said it." 216 On further reflection, Hand believed he could reconcile the human urge to crush opposition with a theory of tolerance:
Now, I say, "Not at all, kill him for the love of Christ and in the
name of God, but always realize that he may be the saint and you
the devil. Go your way with a strong right arm and a swift shining
sword, in full consciousness that what you kill for, and what you
may die for, some smart chap like Laski may write a book and
prove is all nonsense." I agree that in practical application there
may arise some difficulty, but I am a philosopher and if Man is so
poor a17 creature as not to endure the truth, it is no concern of
mine.

2

Thus far, as Hand knew, Holmes would be in complete agreement.
Hand then added his argument for tolerance, again echoing Mill,
but this time with a subtle exception that tempered Mill's
absolutism:
Only, and here we may differ, I do say that you may not cut off
heads, (except for limited periods and then only when you want to
very much indeed), because the victims insist upon saying things
which look against Provisional Hypothesis Number Twenty-Six,
214.

See J. STEPHEN, supra note 86, at 74.

215. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40, 44.
216. Letter from Hand to Holmes (June 22, 1918), reprinted in Gunther, supra note
201, at 756.
217. Id. The practical difficulty of fighting someone while acknowledging that your
cause may be nonsense to which Hand refers is reminiscent of a later comment by Holmes:
It is true that many people can't do their best, or think they can't, unless they are
cocksure.
As long ago as when I was in the Army I realized the power that prejudice
gives a man; but I don't think it necessary to believe that the enemy is a knave in
order to do one's best to kill him.
Holmes to Einstein (May 6,1925), reprinted in THE HOLmEs-EINSTEIN LEnTERs at 239.
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the verification of which to date may be found in its proper place in
the card catalogue. Generally, I insist, you must allow the possibility that if the heads are spared, other cards may be added under
that sub-title
which will have, perhaps, an important
218
modification.

Holmes enjoyed the letter. "Rarely does a letter hit me so exactly where I live as yours, and unless you are spoiling for a fight I
agree with it throughout."2 19 Holmes also surely noticed that Hand
departed from Mill's absolutism in the parenthetical remark "(except for limited periods and then only when you want to very much
indeed)."2 2 0
In that vein, Holmes' reply to Hand stated:
My only qualification, if any, would be that free speech stands no
differently than freedom from vaccination. The occasions would be
rarer when you cared enough to stop it but if for any reason you
did care enough you wouldn't care a damn for the suggestion that
you were acting on a provisional hypothesis and might be wrong.
That is the condition of every act.221
218. Letter from Hand to Holmes, (June 22, 1918), reprinted in Gunther, supra note
201, at 756. Compare Hand's argument with Mill's second ground:
Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does,
contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject
is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that
the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.
J.S. MILL, supra note 77, at 180.
219. Letter from Holmes to Hand (June 24, 1918), reprinted in Gunther, supra note
201, at 756.
220. Letter from Hand to Holmes (June 22, 1918), reprinted in id. at 756. See Mill's
argument with no language of exception, infra at note 221.
221. Letter from Holmes to Hand (June 24, 1918), reprinted in Gunther, supra note
201, at 756-57. Holmes' reference to vaccination law is an example of the rejection of Mill's
absolutist theory of liberty.
The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the
liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known
writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he
likes it or not.
198 U.S. at 75. Thus, to the extent Mill's discussion of freedom of speech, see supra notes 7582 and accompanying text, was intended as an outgrowth of his general principle of liberty,
Holmes would have found it unacceptable. Long after Holmes had written his free speech
dissents, he still found the distinction between speech and other forms of personal freedom
difficult. "I think the argument for free speech, devoutly as I believe in it, is not entirely easy.
In other cases e.g. vaccination, when we know that we have the power, want the end, and are
convinced of the efficacy of the means we don't hesitate very much over even conscientious
scruples. Or at least I shouldn't." Letter from Holmes to Laski (May 18, 1930), reprintedin 2
HomEs-LAK LarrERs 1250 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
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It is important to understand that neither Hand nor Holmes was
attempting an exegesis of the first amendment. Like Mill and Stephen before them, they were arguing abstract principles of government. Hand's argument was prescriptive-how government ought to
behave. Holmes' reply was descriptive-how government and individuals do behave. Holmes' remark to Hand---"I agree with it
throughout," 222 indicates a recognition of this difference. Yet
Holmes' skepticism ran deeper than that of Hand and Mill: If man
can never know absolute truth, it may be impossible to determine
whether suppression of particular speech is good or bad. "Compulsion is bad," wrote Fitzjames Stephen, "(1) When the object aimed
at is bad. (2) When the object aimed at is good, but the compulsion
employed is not calculated to obtain it. (3) When the object aimed
at is good and the compulsion employed is calculated to obtain it,
but at too great an expense. '223 Thus, a true skeptic cannot condemn
all suppression of speech as an absolute principle, for in a particular
case it may be more productive of good than harm.2 Whether a
particular instance of suppression is good or bad may itself be incapable of certainty. "Of course," wrote Holmes, "when I say I don't
believe in [freedom of speech] as a theory I don't mean that I do
'225
believe in the opposite as a theory.
Freedom of speech to Holmes, however defined, was simply one
of many competing principles. It was a principle to which he was
attracted, yet in Holmes' view the sole task for a judge was to determine which principles have been adopted by the society. Years after
his famous dissents exalting the values of free speech, Holmes wrote
Laski, "I think the argument for free speech, devoutly as I believe in
' 226
it, is not entirely easy.
The difference in approach between Hand and Holmes may indicate a difference in commitment to the values represented by freedom of speech, but it does not show that Holmes was insensitive to
its worth. His very evident delight in Hand's letter suggests the op222. Letter from Holmes to Hand (June 24, 1918), reprinted in Gunther, supra note
201, at 756.
223.

J. STEPHEN, supra note 86, at 85.

224. "[P]ersecution has much to be said for it." Letter from Holmes to Einstein (July
11, 1918), reprintedin THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERs 169 (J.P. Peabody ed. 1964).
225. Letter from Holmes to Laski (October 26, 1919), reprinted in 1 HOLMEs-LASKI
Lmeas 217 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
226. Letter from Holmes to Laski (May 18, 1930), reprintedin 2 HoLMEs-LAsKI LETTERS 1250 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
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posite. 227 Nevertheless, there remains a question as to whether the
exchange between Hand and Holmes in the summer of 1918 increased Holmes' appreciation for the value of free speech or contributed to his insistence that he did not believe it as a theory.228 To the
extent that Holmes found Hand to be convinced that freedom of
speech was a principle of justice approximating a conception of natural law, it may have influenced Holmes' disregard of Hand's Masses
test229 when he came to write the opinion in Schenck. 3 °

IX.

THE REPUDIATION OF BLACKSTONE: THE SCHOLARS

"After the later cases (andprobablyyou-I do not remember
exactly) had taught me. . .,s
Holmes to Chafee, June 12, 1922

The exchange with Hand served to remind Holmes of Mill and
arguments favoring a social policy of broad tolerance. Despite
Holmes' view at the time that governmental power prevails over natural law, 23 2 he was more in sympathy with tolerance. "I agree that
the logical result of a fundamental difference is for one side to kill
the other," Holmes wrote later in 1918, "and that persecution has
much to be said for it; but in private life we think it more comfortable for disagreement to end in discussion or silence. '233 Yet a fundamental tenet of Holmes' creed was that the judge should not impose his personal values on society, 34 and prior to 1918 he had seen
227. Holmes not only expressed his pleasure in the letter to Hand, see supra note 219
and accompanying text; he also wrote Laski, "I had a good talk with Judge Hand (Learned)
coming on which led to a characteristic and mighty good letter carrying on the talk." Letter
from Holmes to Laski (June 25, 1918), reprintedin 1 HoLMEs-LAsKI LETrERS 159-60 (M.
Howe ed. 1953).
228. Ifone is in the position of arguing a point, it is sometimes difficult to see the justice
of an opponent's position. The reference to disbelief in freedom of speech as a theory is taken
from a letter to Laski written a few days after the Abrams case was argued. See Letter from
Holmes to Laski (October 26, 1919), reprinted in 1 HOLMEs-LASKI LETTERS 217 (M. Howe
ed. 1953).
229. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
230. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See infra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
231. Letter from Holmes to Chafee (June 12, 1922), Chafee Papers, supra note 19.
232. See supra notes 164, 165 and accompanying text.
233. Letter from Holmes to Einstein (July 11, 1918), reprinted in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN L TERs 169 (J.P. Peabody ed. 1964).
234. One of the queer aspects of duty is when one is called on to sustain or enforce
laws that one believes to be economically wrong and do more harm than good-but
as I think we know very little as to what the laws pronounced good; as there is no
even, inarticulate agreement as to the ideal to be striven for, and no adequate scien-
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little evidence that the constitutional provisions on free speech and
free press were intended to go beyond Blackstone's position. It is
thus unlikely that Hand alone could have led Holmes to abandon
Blackstone. Other influences must be discovered, influences that
could have combined to convince Holmes that the free speech theories he heard in his youth could be legitimately thought of as the
view embodied in the first amendment.
One such influence may have been an article by Dean Roscoe
Pound in the 1916 issue of the Harvard Law Review dedicated to
Justice Holmes.235 P6und described three doctrines on the scope of
liberty of publication under constitutional provisions relating to it:
Blackstone's no previous restraint; the position, which Pound
ascribed to Joseph Story, of the right to publish truth, with good
motives and for proper ends; and Cooley's view that speech is protected from subsequent punishment as long as it is not harmful when
judged by standards of general application. 2 36 Pound said the cases
were in accord with Cooley.237 He dismissed Parker's adoption of
Blackstone in Blanding as dicta, 23 8 and insisted:
[I]f history is to be the sole criterion of interpretation, Story's view
is more nearly in accord with the ends indicated by the historical
development of the subject. Moreover, it is generally conceded that
this restricts the scope of the guarantee too narrowly. Hence, it
would seem that we28 9cannot safely rely on history to give us the
proper construction.
Pound's article dealt with defamation, a matter of state law not immediately germane to Holmes' duties on the Supreme Court. And in
1916, there were still no federal laws that posed significant free
tific evidence that this rather than that will tend to bring it about, if we did agree as
to what we want, I settle down on simple tests. I look at it like going to the theatre-if you can pay for your ticket and are sure you want to go, I have nothing to
say.
Letter from Holmes to Sheehan (November 23, 1912), reprinted in THE HOLMES-SHEEHAN
CORRESPONDENCE 52-53.

235. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29
L. REv. 640 (1916). Holmes surely read this article, both because it was in a law
review issue dedicated to him and because it was written by Pound. "Apropos of Pound,"
Holmes had once written, "perhaps I said before that I keep all his essays. I have one volume
bound and the stuff for another." Letter from Holmes to Pollock (December 29, 1915), reprinted In I HOLMES-POLLOCK LETERS 229 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
236. Pound, supra note 235, at 650-51.
237. Id. at 651.
238. Id. at 651-52 n.29.
239. Id. at 654.
HARV.
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speech issues. Thus, Pound's article did not immediately elicit any
response from Holmes, yet it may have served to warn Holmes that
there was 'substantial support for finding that free speech provisions
in the American state and federal constitutions were repudiations,
not adoptions of Blackstone.
An attack on Blackstone which, unlike Pound's, followed federal
legislation suppressing speech-the Espionage Act of 1917240 and its
amendment in 191 8241-- appeared late in 1918. Zechariah Chafee
published an attack in The New Republic on the definition of freedom of speech that Holmes had set forth in Patterson.241 "This definition of liberty of the press originated with Blackstone, and ought to
be knocked on the head once and for all. ' 24 3 The arguments Chafee
set forth did not differ markedly from those Holmes had read in
Cooley almost fifty years earlier, 4 but the context was sharply different. In 1871 there had been no federal statute that might raise
problems under the first amendment, and deferential speculation
could be filed away as idle talk. In 1918, the ability of the individual
to criticize the central government had become a burning question.
Cooley's argument that prior restraint made no sense with respect to
protection of freedom of speech was irrelevant to the application of
the Massachusetts Constitution that protected only the "liberty of
the press. 24 5 It was, however, directly relevant to the first amendment of the United States Constitution, and in November of 1918,
the first challenges under that guarantee were reaching the Court
2 46
(although the briefs had not yet been filed).
Chafee built on Cooley, dropping the latter's deferential tone
and adding references to pre-revolutionary popular landmarks in the
history of free speech 47 "Those rules had been detested in this
country ever since they were repudiated by jury and populace in the
famous trial of Peter Zenger, the New York printer, the account of
which went through fourteen editions before 1791 .' 48 The free
240. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
242.

Chafee, Freedom of Speech, 17 NEw

REPUBLIC

66 (Nov. 16, 1918).

243. Id. at 67.
244.

Cooley, supra note 95, reviewed by Holmes in 6 AM. L. REv. 140, see supra note

104 and accompanying text.
245. MASS GEN. LAWs ANN. Const. Art. XVI (1780).
246. The Record in Schenck was filed on May 3, 1918, and that of Debs on October 12,
1918. The petitioners' briefs in those cases, however, were not filed until December of 1918.

The brief of petitioner in Frohwerk was not filed until January of 1919.
247. Chafee, supra note 242, at 67.
248.

Id.

HeinOnline -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 143 1982-19832

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:97

speech clauses in federal and state constitutions "were written by
men to whom Wilkes and Junius were household words, who intended to make prosecution for seditious utterances impossible in
this country, ' 249 Chafee cited Jefferson on the Alien and Sedition
2 50 "Thus we have testiActs and Hamilton's defense of Croswell.
25 1
mony from the leaders of both parties.
For the first time, Holmes was confronted with several sound
legal arguments against the notion that "freedom of speech" simply
meant "no prior restraints." Acceptance of those arguments would
finally allow him to reconcile the idealistic, philosophical arguments
in favor of broader protection of speech he had been hearing and
reading since his youth with his reluctance to depart from prevailing
legal doctrine. Here, then, was evidence that Blackstone was not
"the law." What Holmes required, however, was an opportunity to
consider and decide a speech case in which that argument was fairly
presented to the Court. Within a month of Chafee's article, that opportunity presented itself, as the first briefs were filed in the Espionage Act cases.
X.

THE REPUDIATION OF BLACKSTONE: HOLMES AND THE
ESPIONAGE ACT CASES

The Espionage Act cases were three cases involving appeals
from convictions for violating the Espionage Act of 1917, which forbade causing insubordination in the military forces or obstructing
the recruiting service. 52 All three cases came before the Court in
late 1918 and involved appeals from convictions for speech that had
allegedly violated the Act. 253 Before examining the free speech arguments made by the petitioners in their briefs to the Court, it would
be useful to outline the facts in each case.
The first case before the Court, Schenck v. United States,2 "
was an appeal from the conviction of Charles T. Schenck and Elizabeth Baer for conspiracy to circulate a document calculated to cause
insubordination in the armed services and obstruction of the draft.
Schenck, the General Secretary of the Socialist Party, and Baer, a
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 190, 192, 198, 199 and accompanying text.

253. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

254. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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member of its executive board, were found responsible for sending
circulars through the mails to men who had just been drafted to
fight in the first World War. The circulars did not directly urge the
men to obstruct the draft, but, under the heading "Assert Your
Rights," denied that the government had power to conscript individuals and warned readers that "if you do not assert and support your
rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the
solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to
255
retain."
The second case, Frohwerk v. United States,5 6 involved the
conviction of a publisher, Jacob Frohwerk, who had published sev257
eral articles passionately condemning both the War and the draft.
The articles did not expressly counsel disobedience of the draft
law,215 and were not sent or directed to draftees, 259 as were the circulars in Schenck.260
The third, and most controversial, of the convictions was that of
Eugene Debs,26x who had several times been the Socialist candidate
for President of the United States, garnering almost one million
votes in the 1912 election. 8 2 Debs made a number of stirring
speeches in 1918 including the one in Canton, Ohio, for which he
was convicted, urging his listeners to join the Socialist Party; a portion of the speech at issue included condemnation of the war and
opposition to conscription.26 3 Like the articles in Frohwerk,8 4 the
speeches were not directed only at draftees; 265 no direct violation of
the draft law was urged, 26 6 and the government made no showing
that anyone broke the law because of the speeches.
As discussed earlier,26 7 Holmes had never before been presented
in a speech case with an effective argument against Blackstone's
view of free speech as constitutional law. The briefs of the appellants
255. Id.
256. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
257. Id. at 207-08.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 208.
260. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
261. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
262. Debs received 897,011 votes in the 1912 presidential election. 1970
PLEASE ALMANAC 710 (D. Golenpaul ed.).
263. 249 U.S. at 214.
264. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
265. 249 U.S. at 212.
266. Id. at 213-14.
267. See supra notes 100-29 and accompanying text.

INFORMATION
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in the Espionage Act cases, however, undertook, with varying degrees of success, the task of attacking Blackstone. Charles Schenck's
brief, for example, recited the Zenger case, the history of the Alien
and Sedition Act, and cited Cooley to substantiate the argument
that Blackstone was wrong. 28 The treatment of the material, unfortunately, was sketchy and it lacked a central organizing principle,
and the effectiveness of the brief suffered accordingly.
The main brief for the appellant in Frohwerk was only slightly
more effective. Joseph Shewalter, the author of the brief, may have
blunted the persuasiveness of his attack on Blackstone by his lack of
restraint-the brief ran over 334 pages. Half his argument was directed at the impropriety of the draft and the illegality of the war,269
not surprising when one realizes that Shewalter was actually the author of several of the antidraft articles that Frohwerk had published.2 70 The irrelevance of such propagandizing may have led to
the brief being largely ignored by the Court. His initial discussion of
freedom of speech, however, did cite deTocqueville on the relationship between free speech and suffrage 271 and buttressed this view
with quotes on the value of free speech taken from individuals ranging from Socrates to President Woodrow Wilson.272 There was an
extended section on the Alien and Sedition Acts, filled with quotes
from their opponents to show their popular repudiation. 3
The best of the petitioner's briefs was submitted on behalf of
Debs. 7 4 It quoted Cooley and Presidents Wilson and Madison, 7 5
but placed great emphasis on a growing need for protection of
speech:
American tradition has so far made it unnecessary for this court to
give a conclusive reading to the First Amendment in relation to a
268. Brief for Plaintiffs-in-Error at 5-7, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
[hereinafter cited as Schenck brief].
269. Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 173-334, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919) [hereinafter cited as Frohwerk brief].
270. Holmes noted in discussing the articles Frohwerk published, "Then comes a letter
from one of the counsel who argued here, stating that the present force is a part of the regular
army raised illegally; a matter discussed at length in his voluminous brief, on the ground that
before its decision to the contrary the Solicitor General misled this Court as to the law."
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 207 (1919).
271. Frohwerk brief, supra note 269, at 20.
272. Id. at 68, 72-73.
273. Id. at 74-116. For a discussion of the Alien and Sedition Acts, see supra note 101.
274, Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Debs brief].
275. Id. at 62-63.
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sedition enactment by Congress. With a profound sense of this present determination of the meaning of the First Amendment, for a
century and a quarter the palladium of American freedom, we present the language of that amendment to the court as living words
pertinent to the world as we know it-not as a harking back to
legalistic shadings of restraints put upon 2opinion
under the despot76
ism from which the Revolution freed us.
While this argument alone may have left Holmes unmoved, Debs'
lawyers buttressed the argument with citations to Learned Hand's
opinion in Masses.2 " Hand's references to the "hard-bought acquisition in the fight for freedom" and "the normal assumption of democratic government that the suppression of hostile criticism does not
turn upon the justice of its substance or the decency and propriety of
its temper" 278 had a tangible effect on Holmes; after reading the
briefs, Holmes dropped a brief note to Hand:
I read your Masses decision-I haven't the details in my mind and
will assume for present purposes that I should come to a different
result-but I did want to tell you after reading it that I thought
that few judges indeed could have put their view with such force or
in such admirable form. 279
Gilbert Roe, an attorney in a case that would be governed by
the decision in Debs, was permitted to file an amicus brief. 28 0 His
brief drew attention to the power of the jury to determine whether
speech violates a criminal statute and its potential abuse unless restricted by the test set forth in Learned Hand's opinion in the
Masses case. He also quoted St. George Tucker to show an early
repudiation of Blackstone's view.28 1
Taken together, these briefs made a reasonable historical argument that the first amendment was intended to protect against some
forms of subsequent punishment. The government's reply brief in
Debs, however, argued forcefully against an overly broad reading of
the scope of the amendment's protection. 8 2 It pointed out that Jef276. Id. at 62.
277. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), revd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.
1917). See supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
278. Masses, 244 F. at 540.
279. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Learned Hand (February 25, 1919),
reprintedin Gunther, supra note 201, at 758.

280. Brief Amicus Curiae (Roe), Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
281.

Id. at 43. See discussion of St. George Tucker, supra note 50.

282. Reply Brief for the United States, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)
[hereinafter cited as U.S. Debs Reply brief].
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ferson and Madison, in opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts, were
writing on the meaning of the first amendment a decade after its
adoption and in the context of support for their partisans who were
threatened with jail under the Acts. 8 The Jeffersonian positionthat the first amendment prohibited Congress from regulating speech
at all-was rooted in a narrow construction of the grants of power to
Congress in the Constitution. 84 When Marshall interpreted the Constitution in McCulloch v. Maryland28 5 to expand Congress' power to
legislate under the necessary and proper clause, he pulled the props
out from under a narrower construction that would restri t the
power of the federal government. If Congress could enact laws necessary and proper to the exercise of their granted powers, they might
regulate speech if "necessary and proper. '288 The guarantee of freedom of speech, the government argued, stands on its own bottom,
and its definition can be taken from the understanding that the
states gave to similar provisions in their constitutions. 7
In turning to what that understanding might be, however, the
government did something critical: it wavered in its support of
Blackstone. The brief of John Lord O'Brian and Alfred Bettman for
the government did cite Blackstone and Patterson,8 8 but it then
continued:
This view is to some extent inapplicable to free speech, as a licensing or censorship system can not, in the nature of things, be applied
to the spoken as distinguished from the printed word. Some authorities hold that the constitutional provision grants some degree of
immunity from punishment and restricts the power of the legislature to the field of those289crimes which were punishable according to
common-law standards.
The brief then cited Cooley, repudiating Blackstone, and quoted
from that text.2 90 It also quoted from Pound's article supporting
283. Id. at 9-10.
284. Id. at 7-8. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
285. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional." Id. at 421.
286. Id. See U.S. Debs Reply brief, supra note 282, at 13.
287. U.S. Debs Reply brief, supra note 282, at 15-16.
288. Brief for United States, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), at 80-81
[hereinafter U.S. Debs brief].
289. Id. at 81.
290. Id. at 81-82. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
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Cooley's view. 291 As to the arguments from the history of the Alien
and Sedition Acts, the brief sidestepped support of the Acts:
But the clauses of the Espionage Act which are involved in this
case bear no analogy whatever to the objectionable features of the
old Sedition Law. That law sought to punish libelous attacks on the
Government. The Espionage Act carefully avoids that pitfall. It
does not seek to punish attacks on the Government, however malicious or libelous.292
With both sides citing Cooley's repudiation of Blackstone,
Holmes was forced to reconsider his decision in Patterson.Against
the backdrop of the criticism of Blackstone and Patterson he had
seen in Chafee's article in the New Republic95 and the approval of
Cooley in Pound's article, 294 the briefs must have seemed, to
Holmes, the final evidence that Blackstone's view had lost its traditional underpinning. With the weakening of the standard historical
view, the policy of tolerance urged by Mill2 95 and Hand29 6 to which
Holmes was sympathetic 297 could finally become a factor in interpreting the constitutional guarantee.
Thus, Holmes finally rethought the meaning of the first amendment. "It may well be," he wrote in Schenck, "that the prohibition
of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous
restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson v. Colorado,205 U.S. 454, 462."' 298
This tepid disengagement from his earlier opinion is followed by a
critical admission-"We admit that in many places and in ordinary
291. U.S. Debs brief, supra note 288, at 84-88.
292. Id. at 83. "Thus far, however, the government has not advanced this particular
contention [Blackstone's version of free speech] in support of the section, for the reason that
the cases thus far pressed by it on appeal have been cases involving direct incitement to disobedience." John Lord O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, XLII Report of the New York State
Bar Association 275, 307 (1919).
293. See supra notes 240-51 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. "I reread Mill on Liberty-fine old
sportsman-Mill." Letter from Holmes to Laski, (February 28, 1919) reprinted in HOLMESLASKI LETTERS 187. See John Lord O'Brian, Changing Aspects of Freedom: The Government
and Civil Liberties: World War I and After, 1952 John Randolph Tucker, Washington and
Lee University, in which O'Brian suggests that Holmes drew his inspiration from the following
passage in Mill: "Even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are
expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous
act." J.S. MILL,supra note 158, at 67.
296. See supra notes 201-21 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
298. 249 U.S. at 51-52.
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times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would
have been within their constitutional rights. 299 With this one sentence, Holmes shed the view that government had ,unlimited power
to punish speech, a view he had adhered to most of his life. The
search for limits on the power had begun.
XI. THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST
The expression that you refer to was not helped by any book
that I know of. . . .But I did think hard on the matter of attempts in my Common Law and a Mass case, later in the Swift
case (U.S.) And I thought it out unhelped. I noted that Bishop
made a slight modification of his text after I had printed but
without reference to me-I speak from ancient memory-And
much later I found an English Nisi Prius case in which one of the
good judges had expressed this notion in a few words.300
Holmes to Chafee, June 12, 1922
Scholarship, advocacy, and history finally persuaded Holmes to
abandon Blackstone and to search for some alternative view of the
amount of protection to be afforded speech under the first amendment. To aid him in this search, Holmes turned to the source most
readily available-the briefs of counsel in the Espionage Act cases.
Although the briefs of counsel in the Espionage cases agreed
that Blackstone's definition of liberty of the press was repudiated by
our history, they presented widely different views of the scope of protection afforded by the first amendment. The government contended
that there was no immunity for any speech generally recognized as
harmful. 30 1 Citing Cooley, the brief suggested that standards for determining what is harmful should be ascertained by looking "to the
common law rules which were in force when the constitutional guaranties were established. ' 3 0 2 Such standards were, however, difficult
to ascertain some 150 years later. To begin with, constitutional guarantees of free speech were adopted in states at various periods of
time beginning in 1776. This makes pertinent the question whether
the "common law rules" referred to in Cooley were those of 1776 or
1791, those of England or those of the various states that imparted
unique twists to the common law. Further, no one had suggested that
the first amendment enshrined the specific eighteenth century appli299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 52.
Letter from Holmes to Chafee (June 12, 1922), Chafee Papers, supra note 20.
U.S. Debs brief, supra note 288, at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
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cations of common law. Cooley's test envisioned standards deduced
by generalizing on the kinds of harms against which the common
law offered protection in the late eighteenth century. For such a generalization to be flexible enough to reach the novel problems of life
in the twentieth century, however, it would have to be so abstract
303
that its utility as a workable limit on government would vanish.
And even Cooley repudiated the common law doctrine of seditious
libel as contrary to the ideas of free speech embodied in American
constitutions. 3° '
In the final analysis, the government's brief in Debs did not
commit itself to any specific standard. It argued instead that the defendants were properly convicted under any reasonable construction
of the first amendment, including several of those proposed by the
defendants themselves. This argument succeeded-the convictions
were upheld-but its failing to marshal effective arguments for a
specific reading of the first amendment left Holmes free to speculate
as to what speech the government 'could constitutionally regulate.
The petitioners, for the most part, were no more helpful than
the government in offering a workable test for the first amendment
that Holmes might be willing to accept. Counsel for Charles
Schenck tentatively proffered the most extreme view: "It can be even
urged farther that the right of free speech, if it is allowed fully, gives
the right to persuade another to violate a law, since legally, it is only
the one who actually violates the law who should be punished. 'a 5
This argument may have been the trigger for Holmes' memorable
example: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic."306 The example may be remote from the specific leaflets distributed in the Schenck case, but, at the outset, it disposes of the
303. Modern telecommunications, for example, enable speakers to invade the home in
ways unknown to the framers and picketing in labor disputes created new speech-related issues
with which the law had problems dealing, as Holmes' labor opinions in Massachusetts revealed. See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011 (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
304. See Cooley, supra note 95 at 426-30.
305. Schenck brief, supra note 268, at 7.
306. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. John Vento, a colleague at the NEH Seminar at Yale,
suggested that Holmes may have had a particular event in mind when formulating his example. For instance, in December of 1913, the front page of The New York Times carried a story
of a tragedy in Calumet, Michigan. A drunk staggered into a Christmas gathering in that
town, and while the children were standing in the aisles waiting to move forward for their
gifts, shouted "Fire." In the ensuing panic, eighty persons, including fifty-six children, were
trampled to death. N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1913, p. 1 col. 8.
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argument that no speech may be constitutionally punished.3 07
The real core of Schenck's brief was less extreme: It urged the
Court to consider, in deciding whether certain speech was protected,
"whether an expression is made with sincere purpose to communicate honest opinion or belief, or whether it masks a primary intent to
incite to forbidden action or whether it does, in fact, incite to forbidden action." 30 8 The government responded that Schenck was properly convicted under the very test he proposed.3 09 Holmes' opinion
seems directed to this point: "Of course the document would not
have been sent unless it had been intended to have some effect," he
wrote, "and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have
upon persons subject to the draft except to influence them to ob3 10
struct the carrying of it out.
It might also be possible to read Schenck's argument as permitting punishment only where the forbidden action actually does occur
as a result of the defendant's statements. This was the position of
Joseph Shewalter in his brief for Jacob Frohwerk. Although most of
his lengthy brief argued that the first amendment was intended to
deprive Congress of all power to regulate speech, he scaled down his
position in a reply brief to assert that defendants could be punished
only if their speech in fact induced an illegal act.-"' Thus, he argued,
the indictment was defective for failure to specify that an individual
refused to serve when drafted as a result of the articles defendant
published. 1 2 Holmes met this argument in Schenck:
It seems to be admitted that if anIactual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced. The statute of 1917 in § 4 punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual obstruction. If the act,
(speaking, or circulating a paper), its tendency and the intent with
307.

Ernst Freund sharply criticized Holmes' use of the example as inapposite to the

facts of the Espionage Act cases, particularly Debs, see Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom
of Speech, THE Naw REPUBLIC, May 3, 1919, at 13, reprintedin 40 U. CI. L. REv. 239

(1973). Holmes, however, used it as a response to the sweeping claim of Schenck's brief rather
than as a narrowly focused examination of conduct in the immediate cases.
308.

Schenck brief, supra note 268, at 14.

309.

Brief for United States at 35, Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

310. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51.
311. Compare Frohwerk brief, supra note 269, at 27-34 (arguing that first amendment
was intended to deprive Congress of power to regulate speech.), with Reply Brief for Plaintiff-

in-Error at 11-13, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (modifying argument,
stating defendant could only be punished for speech which induced illegal acts) [hereinafter

cited as Frowerk, reply brief].
312.

Frohwerk, reply brief, supra note 311, at 11-13.
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which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground
for saying
13
that success alone warrants making the act a crime.
Arguably the most persuasive speech-protective standard urged
by any of the petitioners was the Masses test formulated by Judge
Learned Hand and pressed earnestly by counsel for Eugene V. Debs:
It is our contention that the rule as stated by Judge Hand is the
correct rule, and that the test for criminal responsibility for expressions leading up to insubordination, etc. is the common law liability
as an accessory created by urging violation of law upon others. Beyond purposeful incitement to specific unlawfulness on the part of
others, there
is no power in Congress to make public utterances
14
criminal.3
The government's brief attacked Hand's test by referring to the
circuit court's reversal, as well as its inability to reach the speaker
who, like Mark Antony in Julius Caesar, incites the crowd to violence without actually telling them to commit unlawful acts. 315 In
fact, Hand had attempted to deal with that problem. His focus in
Masses was on whether a reasonable man would understand the
speaker to urge his hearers to commit unlawful acts: "While, of
course, this may be accomplished as well by indirection as expressly,
since words carry the meaning that they impart, the definition is exhaustive." 316 Hand cited neither case law nor specific history for his
test, but relied instead on the necessity for stringent standards to
protect the speech of the individual who merely sets forth articulately and even passionately his criticism of existing law. As Hand
later wrote Holmes, "The responsibility only began when the words
were directly an incitement. 317
Holmes' opinions did not state why he rejected Hand's "reasonable man" test. Part of the reason may have been the government's
argument that petitioner's reformulation of Hand's test- "purposeful incitement to specific unlawfulness on the part of others"
-was the act for which Debs was convicted under the judge's
charge.318 In addition, Holmes apparently did not, at least immedi313.

249 U.S. at 52.

314.

Debs brief, supra note 274, at 71.

315. U.S. Debs brief, supra note 288, at 72-75.
316. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d
Cir. 1917).

317.

Letter from Hand to Holmes (late March, 1919), reprintedin Gunther, supra note

201, at 758.
318. See U.S. Debs brief, supra note 288, at 75-77.
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ately, perceive how the test he eventually used-"clear and present
danger"-differed from that of Hand.319 In any event, Holmes was a
stylist who preferred to use his own phrases and think things through
to his personal satisfaction, rather than rely on others.$2"
What Holmes finally settled on as the source for his test was his
own theory of the law of attempt: "I did think hard on the matter of
attempts in my Common Law and a Mass case, later in the Swift
case (U.S.). 3 21 It is not clear what led Holmes to the law of attempt, but the connection may have been inadvertently inspired by
the reference in Debs' brief to "common law liability as an accessory. '3 22 An accessory is only guilty if a crime has been committed;
as discussed earlier, Holmes rejected the analogous view that speech
tending toward the commission of a crime should only be punishable
if the crime is in fact committed.323 But the analogy to one type of
liability under the criminal law suggests analogies to others. Thus it
may have sparked Holmes' consideration of the law of criminal attempt. To properly explain why Holmes may have seized on attempt,
it is necessary to digress into an analysis of Holmes' peculiar interest
and expertise in the area of criminal attempt law.
As Holmes told Chafee, he had thought hard about the law of
attempts at various points in his career.32 ' This hard thought had
succeeded in producing a distinctive view, which he expressed in the
32
Common Law32 5 and applied as a judge both in Massachusetts
319. "[I] don't quite get your point.... I don't see how you [and I] differ." Holmes to
Hand (April 3, 1919), reprintedIn Gunther, supra note 201, at 759-60.
320. For example, Holmes was upset over his article in HarvardLaw Review on Natural
Law. See supra notes 210, 215 and accompanying text. "After I sent back the proofs the other
day I was depressed to think that one little phrase 'for the joy of it' was an echo of Ruskin."
Holmes to Pollock (October 31, 1918), reprinted in I HOLMES-POLLOCK LErrERS 270 (M.
Howe, ed. 1941). Holmes told his law clerks to cite first to his prior Supreme Court opinions;
if there were none, "then his opinions in Massachusetts were next best; and last you could cite,
if you must cite some precedent, the pronouncements of his living or deceased brethren." F.
BIDDLE, MR. JusTlcE HOLMES 145 (1942).
321. Letter from Holmes to Chafee (June 12, 1922), Chafe papers, supra note 20.
322. Debs brief, supra note 274, at 71.
323. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
324. Letter from Holmes to Chafe (June 12, 1922), Chafee papers, supra note 20.
325. See 0. W. HOLMES, JR, TrE COMMON LAw 65-69 (1881) [hereinafter cited as THE
COMMON LAW].
326. See Commonwealth v. Peaslec, 177 Mass. 267 (1901); Commonwealth v. Kennedy,
170 Mass. 18 (1897).
In Peaslee, the defendant had been convicted below on a charge of attempted arson. He
had arranged materials to burn a building he owned; after unsuccessfully asking someone to
light a match to the materials, he started toward the building himself but turned around while
still a quarter of a mile away. 177 Mass. at 268-71. Holmes there had an opportunity to
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and on the Supreme Court. 327 The accepted doctrine of attempts in
Holmes' day made the evil intention of the actor the key to the law
of attempts. 3a2 The act, according to this view, was only evidence to
discuss his theory of attempt in cases where the accused had stopped short of completing all
the steps necessary to accomplish the crime:
If the preparation comes very near to the accomplishment of the act, the intent
to complete it renders the crime so probable that the act will be a misdemeanor
although there is still a locus penitentioe in the need of a further exertion of the will
to complete the act. As was observed in a recent case, the degree of proximity held
sufficient may vary with circumstances, including among other things the apprehension which the particular crime is calculated to excite.
If the accused intended to rely upon his own hands to the end, he must be
shown to have had a present intent to accomplish the crime without much delay,
and to have had this intent at a time and place where he was able to carry it out.
Id. at 272-74. Because there was no allegation in the indictment that the defendant had ever
had the intent to burn the building at a point where he himself could have done so, and
because the solicitation was not alleged in the indictment as one of the acts constituting an
attempt, Holmes reversed the conviction. Id. at 274. See also THE COMMON LAw, supra note
325, at 66-68 (discussion of this particular species of attempt, including a prescient hypothetical with facts much like those in Peaslee).
Holmes' theory of attempt in cases where all the overt acts necessary to complete the
crime had been committed was applied in Kennedy, where the defendant had been convicted
below of attempted murder for putting poison in someone's mustache cup. In affirming the
conviction, Holmes wrote:
As the aim of the law is not to punish sins, but to prevent certain external
results, the act done must come pretty near to accomplishing that result before the
law will notice it.. . . Usually acts which are expected to bring about the end without further inferference on the part of the criminal are near enough, unless the
expectation is very absurd.
170 Mass. at 20-21. See also THE COMMON LAW, supra note 325, at 66. It is not clear which
of these cases Holmes meant when he referred Chafee to "a Mass case." See supra text accompanying note 321. The similarity between Peaslee and Swift as to the type of attempt
suggests that Holmes was focussing on Peaslee. Compare Peaslee with Swift & Company v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), discussed infra at note 327.
327. See Swift & Company v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). In Swift, an antitrust case, the lower court had enjoined the defendants (meat producers) from continuing to
combine in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The defendants alleged that the
overt acts they had committed-failure to bid on certain contracts-were lawful and that the
injunction was thus prematurely issued. Holmes upheld the injunction, finding that the companies were reachable because the intent with which they acted rendered their conduct sufficiently dangerous:
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the Law seeks
to prevent-for instance the monopoly,---but require further acts in addition to the
mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is
necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen.
170 Mass. at 20-21. While not an attempt case, Swift is notable because Holmes' focus there,
as in Peaslee, supra note 326, was on intent as an element in determining whether conduct
otherwise short of an unlawful act is dangerous enough to warrant state intervention.
328. See 1 J. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAw, 432-66 (7th ed.
1882), cited in THE COMMON LAW, supra note 325, at 66. See also Rogat, The Judge as
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show the evil nature of the actor."2 9 Holmes insisted in focusing instead on the dangerousness of the act."' 0 The intention of the actor
was relevant to Holmes only insofar as it increased the danger to be
apprehended from the act.331 His analysis assumed that the main
function of the law of attempts was to deter conduct that created a
serious and unacceptable risk of harm. 3 2
Holmes subdivided attempts into two main categories. The first
was comprised of those acts whose natural and probable effect would
result in a substantive crime, where the crime is prevented by chance
or the intervention of another agent. 333 The second category consisted of acts that in themselves would not produce the substantive
crime, but are merely steps towards its commission. 3 4 In the latter
case, the intention of the actor is important to show that an otherwise innocent act is pregnant with danger and that the state thus
needs to act.335 The point at which the state should intervene is determined by the "nearness of the danger,
the greatness of the harm,
3 36
and the degree of apprehension felt.1
The need to delineate the point at which the state should intervene has its source in the notion of individual autonomy, the right of
an individual to do as he or she pleases so long as conduct dangerous
enough to be proscribed as criminal is not engaged in. The closer one
approaches the commission of such dangerous acts the more compelling becomes the need for the state to sacrifice the good of individual
autonomy to prevent the greater risk of harm to others or to society
generally. Thus the central concept behind the classifications Holmes
used to define attempts was "the degree of danger shown
by experi'337
ence to attend that act under those circumstances.
The determination of whether conduct in Holmes' second category of attempts-those where the actor has not yet completed all
the acts necessary to naturally and probably bring about the proscribed result 33 ---is dangerous enough for the state to intervene
Spectator,
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

31 U. Cm. L. Rav. 213, 215 (1964).
See J. BISHOP, supra note 328, at 436.
See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 325, at 67.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 66-70.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 66-67.
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must be made, as we have seen, based upon several factors which
bear on dangerousness, including the gravity of the harm risked and
how close the attempt has come to bringing about that harm. 339 The

focus on conduct in Holmes' analysis thus reduces the actor's evil
intent to one of the factors bearing on the dangerousness of the
conduct.3 40
It is true that the speeches and pamphlets which were the objects on which the Espionage Act convictions were based do not
neatly fit the classifications that Holmes used for the law of attempts. For example, if one views the speech at issue as an attempt
to bring about the substantive harm of obstructing the draft, the
speaker/writers in the cases had completed all the acts they planned
to do, thus presumably triggering the first arm of Holmes' attempt
analysis34 1 and requiring a focus on whether the natural and probable effect of the speech would be to cause obstruction. This part of
Holmes' analysis, however, assumes that if the harm has not been
brought about it is because of chance or the intervention of another
agent, that apart from such "preventers" the harm would have occurred in the natural course of events.3 The substantive harm of
obstruction, however, is brought about, in a speech case, not by the
forces of nature but by the independent decisions of members of the
audience. And the second arm of Holmes' analysis postulates a series
of steps toward the crime which have yet to be completed; 34 3 because

the speaker/writers in the cases had completed all the necessary
steps, that part of Holmes' attempts analysis would also not seem
applicable. One might thus conclude that Holmes would have been
unlikely to see the connection between attempt and speech.
Such a conclusion, however, fails to recognize, as Holmes surely
did, that the broader policy considerations underlying the law of attempt and the law of speech limitation are the same. In both cases
the courts are called upon to mediate between the right of an individual to personal freedom and the right of the government to punish
dangerous conduct. And in both cases the conduct sought to be regulated is thought to require government intervention only because it
increases the probability that other, clearly undesirable results will
occur-a policy that requires careful fine tuning because, if read too
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. at 68.
Id.
Id. at 65-66.
Id.
Id. at 66-67.
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broadly, it can lead to oppressive interference with individual freedoms of conduct or speech. Thus most conduct, and most speech,
should not be regulated, despite a tenuous connection with ultimate
harm; as to conduct, Holmes had held, in a Massachusetts attempt
case, that such conduct "must come pretty near to accomplishing
[the proscribed results] before the law will notice it."'3 44 As to
speech: "The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. ' 345 Thus, in Schenck,
Holmes sought to mediate between the power of the government to
deal with activities of a harmful nature and the ability of the individual to engage in activities that do not result in harm by analogy
to the common law of attempts as he had formulated it in The Common Law.
The result of relying on this analogy was that Holmes would
naturally turn to the numerous factors he had developed for determining dangerousness in the two kinds of attempt cases-the gravity
of the harm risked, 346 its immediacy, and the likelihood that it would
result from the speech at issue, the latter to be measured either by
4
the natural effect of the words used or by the speaker's purpose.3 7
344. Kennedy, 170 U.S. at 20-21. See supra note 326.
345. Schenek, 249 U.S. at 52.
346. In this respect, Holmes may have noted the new edition of Bishop on Criminal
Law, see supra note 328, which came out shortly after The Common Law was published. In
discussing the law of attempt, Bishop retained the traditional emphasis on evil attempt, see J.
BISHOP, supra note 328, at 436, but he added a new section to the seventh edition-§ 768a
-dealing with solicitation as an attempt:
[A]ll sufficiently direct solicitations to commit any of the heavier offenses are punishable attempts. And it would be within established principles to hold that in proportion to the gravity of the particular crime, the solicitation, to come within the
law's cognizance, may be less direct.
Id. at 461. This view coincided nicely with Holmes' statement in The Common Law that included the greatness of the harm as a factor in defining an attempt. See THE CoMON LAW,
supra note 325, at 68. This addition to Bishop may be the one referred to by Holmes in his
letter to Chafee--"I noted that Bishop made a slight modification of his text after I had
printed but without reference to me." Holmes to Chafee, Chafee Papers, supra note 20.
Holmes' chagrin at not being referred to may have been a reaction to a remark made in
Bishop's eighth edition:
Among the legal text-books, there was not any one, English or American, until the
present author wrote, which contained on the subject [of attempts] more than a few
paragraphs of loose and inadequate statements of doctrine. If more extended expositions have been made by any author since, it has been simply in imitation and following of the present series of books.
J. BISHOP, NEw COMMENTARIEs ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 437-38 (8th ed. 1892).
347. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 325, at 68-69.
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Such issues, which are necessarily ones of "proximity and degree," 3 8
as Holmes described the test for the constitutionality of punishing
speech, also implicate the issue of deciding which factfinder-the
judge or the jury--determines whether the line separating lawful
from unlawful speech has been crossed.
A rule of law requiring the finder of fact to weigh several factors in determining liability or culpability can present close questions. Holmes suggested in The Common Law that, at least initially,
such questions be left to the jury:
[T]he court, not entertaining any clear views of public policy applicable to the matter, derives the rule to be applied from daily experience, as it has been agreed that the great body of the law of tort
has been derived. But the court further feels that it is not itself
possessed of sufficient practical experience to lay down the rule intelligently. It conceives that twelve men taken from the practical
part of the community can aid its judgment.3 Therefore,
it aids its
49
conscience by taking the opinion of the jury.
While willing to leave such balancing and weighing initially to a
jury, Holmes was also aware that lax application by juries of such
complex tests, or perversions of them in times of hysteria, was a danger of peer justice that needed to be guarded against. In The Common Law, Holmes mentioned a case in which a slave was convicted
of attempted rape when he ran after a white woman but desisted
before he caught her.350 "The degree of apprehension may affect the
[jury's] decision," Holmes wrote, "as well as the degree of
probability that the crime will be accomplished. No doubt the fears
peculiar to a slave-owning community had their share in the conviction which has just been mentioned."' 51 It is certainly not difficult to
imagine a case where the fears peculiar to a community could sway
a jury in a speech case-during a time of particularly strong antiCommunist hysteria, for example, a speech that might otherwise be
considered only mildly critical of the American government could be
magnified, by a jury gripped in the hysteria, into a dangerous call to
revolution. To deal with this difficulty, however, Holmes needed only
to turn again to the common law of attempt for assistance-under
that law, the court may determine that a verdict should have been
348.

249 U.S. at 52.

349.
350.
351.

THE COMMON LAW, supra note 325, at 123 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.
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directed for the defendant where the acts did not come sufficiently
close to the threatened harm.352
In sum, the clear and present danger test as Holmes understood
it permitted the state to punish any speech that posed a threat of
immediate serious harm. The likelihood that the harm would result
determined the existence of a threat. It was measured either by the
natural effect of the speech or by the intent with which the speech
was given. If it was absurd to believe that the intended result would
follow from the speech, the speech was not so dangerous as to be
forbidden. The proximity of the speech to harm, including the determination of the defendants' intent, was a jury question. A verdict
should not be directed for the defendant unless clearly warranted on
the facts, although proximity to harm was emphasized, and more
experience might legitimately lead courts to intervene and direct verdicts for defendants.
Thus, in Schenck, Holmes took a giant step forward from the
"no prior restraints" view he had abandoned, establishing the principle that government should not have the power to punish speech subsequent to its publication unless the speech presented a "clear and
present danger" of bringing about some substantive harm the government is empowered to prohibit. One might expect that, following
the handing down of the opinion, Holmes would be hailed as a visionary, a champion of free speech. As will be discussed, however,
quite the contrary was true. 53
The most obvious reason that the true impact of Schenck went
largely unnoticed was that in Schenck, and also in Debs and
Frohwerk, Holmes applied his new test to uphold the Espionage Act
convictions of the defendants,3 54 which undoubtedly led all but the
most careful readers to feel that it was "business as usual" as far as
free speech in the courts was concerned. The next section explores
whether Holmes brought the critical tirade on himself by erroneously applying his own test in the Espionage Act cases. 55
Two other aspects of the clear and present danger test were sufficiently ambiguous that later commentators could misunderstand
how far Holmes intended to go in Schenck.
The first ambiguity arose because the determination of when an
act may be made unlawful normally raises no constitutional
352. Cf.Id. at 123.
353. See infra notes 369-406 and accompanying text.
354. Debs, 249 U.S. at 216; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 210; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 53.
355. See Infra notes 374-425 and accompanying text.
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problems. The law of attempts, for example, implicates not a constitutional standard in the criminal law but rather a joint effort by
judge and jury to determine when the legislatively mandated violation occurred. Holmes' reference to clear and present danger, based
as it was on the law of attempts, might thus have been similarly
viewed by critics as an interpretation of the Espionage Act. Hand's
standard in Masses was, in fact, just such an interpretation.3 56 And
the Court itself appeared, at one time, to assume that Holmes' opinion in Schenck went no further than statutory interpretation. 357 Such
an assumption, however, is incorrect. Holmes did speak in Schenck
on the general limits of speech protected by the Constitution: "[T]he
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
done." 358 After giving examples of punishable speech not involving
the Espionage Act, Holmes said, "The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."35 9 The importation of the clear and present danger standard
from the law of attempt into the limits of constitutional protection of
free speech changed its nature from a test subordinate to legislative
consideration to one which put a limit on the discretion of the legislature. True, it was still unclear, despite the vigorousness of the language in Schenck, at what point the judge would intervene to limit
the legislature. However, the ability of the judge to check the jury in
an ordinary criminal attempt case had been transformed by Holmes
into an ability to check the legislature as well and was thus a giant
step beyond Patterson.
A second issue, which may have misled later critics, lurked in
the clear and present danger test formulated by Holmes in Schenck.
The test referred to proximity to "the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. ' ' 360 There was no doubt that Congress could
356.

See supra note 194 and accompanying text.

357. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 671 (1925).
358. 249 U.S. at 52. Holmes had said in The Common Law that, in determining
whether the act could be considered an attempt, "[p]ublic policy, that is to say, legislative
considerations, are at the bottom of the matter." THE COMMON LAw, supra note 325, at 68. In

the context of the statement, however, he was merely saying that public policy is reflected by
the legislature and that the point at which an act should be considered an attempt is an issue

of public policy. In practice, the point was determined by the judge. By constitutionalizing the
issue in Schenck, see infra note 359 and accompanying text, Holmes removed the issue from
the legislative plane.

359.

249 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).

360.

Id.
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prevent obstruction of the draft, but Holmes did not spell out in the
spring of 1919 what substantive evils might be beyond the power of
the legislature to prevent. Six years later, in Gitlow v. New York,"'1
the majority of the Court argued, over Holmes' dissent, that speech
tending toward harm was itself an evil with which the legislature
could deal. 62 This approach, which may be what the Court thought
Holmes meant at the time he wrote Schenck, avoided any analysis of
the proximity of the speech to the ultimate harm feared.
Long before Gitlow, however, Holmes had stated that history
was against the notion that the first amendment had left the common law doctrine of seditious libel in force.363 Thus, he recognized
that government could not determine for itself which evils it was permitted to prevent. Although no explicit statement was made in
Schenck on this point, there is strong evidence to indicate that he
had already reached this position. First, the reference in Schenck to
evils Congress has a right to prevent suggests, by negative implication, the existence of harms beyond the reach of Congress. Second,
the repudiation of Blackstone was based largely on a new approach
to the history of the first amendment. When Holmes viewed the
guarantee of freedom of speech from the perspective of the social
concerns that led to its adoption, it became clear to him that the
legislative determinations that truth should be a defense in libel were
more accurate perceptions of the meaning of freedom of speech than
the judicial interpretations to which they were a response.3 " This
mode of reasoning would logically result in Holmes' placing greater
weight on the popular overthrow of the Alien and Sedition Acts than
on statements in judicial opinions upholding them.' 5 Finally, in a
letter written in May of 1919 defending his Espionage Act decisions,
Holmes emphasized the constitutionality of "the clauses under con3 66 This emphasis in turn indicates reservations over the
sideration."
361. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
362. Id. at 667-70.
363. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
364. This recalls the paradox in Kent's Commentaries, which Holmes edited in 1873.
Kent pointed to the legislative determinations making truth a defense, but permitted the
reader to infer that judicial decisions were the proper mode of interpretation. Holmes had
accepted the judicial opinion as the basis for definitions of freedom of speech in Patterson. See
supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. The subsequent rejection of the case law might
have pointed him to the legislative reactions to the cases. See 2 KENT's CoMMENTARIES, supra
note 57, at 26.
365. See 1. MILLER, supra note 101, at 235-41.
366. Letter from Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919) (enclosed with a letter to
Harold Laski (May 13, 1919)), reprinted in 1 HoLmEs-LAsMKI LaTEas 202 (M. Howe ed.
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constitutionality of other sections of the Act.

None of these factors compels a conclusion that Holmes had
fully developed his understanding of the first amendment in the process of writing the Espionage Act cases. They do, however, show that
it is erroneous to assume that Holmes' later dissents represented a
change in basic views beyond that represented by Schenck itself.

XII.

APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD IN

Schenck, Frohwerk AND

Debs
"I have never seen any reason to doubt that the questions of
law that alone were before this Court in the cases of Schenck,
Frohwerk and Debs, 249 U.S. 47, 204, 211, were rightly
3 67

decided."

Abrams v. U.S. (Holmes, J., dissenting)
Less than a week after the decisions in Frohwerk and Debs were
handed down, Holmes wrote Harold Laski, "I greatly regretted having to write them-and (between ourselves) that the Government

pressed them to a hearing."3 8 The Debs decision touched off a storm
of protest from the left and sparked two sharply critical law review
comments. 69 In particular, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., wrote that the
clear and present danger test could not reach Debs if properly applied.37 0 The contrast between Holmes' characterization of the defendants as "poor devils"371 and his willingness to affirm their convictions raises the question whether he applied his own clear and
present danger test or ignored it until his dissent in Abrams in the
fall of 1919.372 The quote that begins this section clearly indicates
that Holmes himself felt he had properly applied the test in upholding the convictions.
1953).
367. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
368. Letter from Holmes to Laski (March 16, 1919), reprintedin 1 HOLMES-LAsKI LETrns 190 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
369. Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REv. 932 (1919); Freund,
The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, THE NEw Ra putac, May 3, 1919, at 13, reprinted
in 40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 239 (1979)).
370. Chafee, supra note 369, at 967-68.
371. "Now I hope the President will pardon him [Debs] and some other poor devils with
whom I have more sympathy." Letter from Holmes to Pollock (April 27, 1919), reprintedin 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LEarrEs 11 (M. Howe ed. 1941). "1I... have said whenever it was proper
that I thought the President should pardon a lot of poor devils that it was my misfortune to
have to write opinions condemning." Letter from Holmes to Pollock (June 17, 1919), reprinted
in id. at 15.
372. See Gunther, supra note 17, at 738-40; Z. CHAFEE, supra note 10, at 86.
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A reexamination of the facts of each case, keeping in mind the
context in which they were heard-just after the end of the First
World War-lends considerable support to the view that Holmes
was properly applying, in his own mind, the test he had developed in
Schenck. For example, the circulars distributed by Charles Schenck
and Elizabeth Baer were directed at draftees; 73 though they did not
directly urge obstruction, the call to "Assert Your Rights,"' 74 combined with the targeted audience, showed a clear intention to encourage the draftees to refuse to obey the draft law. This intent,
combined with the setting in which the circulars were sent (the
midst of war) could quite reasonably have combined to convince
Holmes that the circulars posed a clear and present danger to the
conscription effort. The setting becomes particularly important when
one remembers Holmes' own Civil War experiences and his feeling
that the emergency of war allows government greater latitude to
"sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence. ' 375
While Frohwerk would seem, at first blush, to present a weaker
case for upholding conviction than Schenck, a closer examination
reveals that a combination of circumstances made the issue on appeal to the Supreme Court a narrow one. Frohwerk, convicted under
the Espionage Act of 1917 for publishing several articles critical of
the war and the draft, was represented both at trial and on appeal by
attorney Joseph Shewalter.7 6 In this case it would have been more
fitting if the attorney had been the defendant, both because it was
Shewalter's articles that furnished the basis of the prosecution37 7 and
because it was his poor representation that resulted in the publisher
going to jail. Shewalter failed to get agreement on a bill of exceptions and was unable, despite an extention of time, to get the transcript of the trial typed to meet the date for filing the appeal.3 7 8
Consequently, the sole issue appealed to the Supreme Court was the
sufficiency of the indictment. Neither the evidence adduced at trial
nor the rulings or charge of the judge below were before the Court.
Shewalter argued that the articles could not violate the law, but
Holmes replied that they were similar to those involved in
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
Id. at 51.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
249 U.S. at 205.
See Id. at 207.
Id. at 206.
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Schenck.3 79 Under normal circumstances, the articles might not violate the law, but they could pose a clear and present danger in some
unusual situation. Without the trial transcript, the Supreme Court
could not know the situation in which the articles were published.
And although the burden was on the government to prove a clear
and present danger, a jury had found the defendant guilty on the
basis of a charge and evidence that the Court could not review.
Thus, Holmes had to assume the charge was proper and supported
by the strongest possible evidence consistent with the indictment.
"[I]t is impossible to say," wrote Holmes for the Court, "that it
might not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in
quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame and
that the fact was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper
out., 8 o
It is likely that Holmes suspected Frohwerk was improperly
convicted. His may have been one of the cases Holmes had in mind
when he wrote Laski: "The federal judges seem to me (again between ourselves) to have got hysterical about the war."""1 But the
narrow question before the Court simply did not open up the conduct
of the trial or the evidence there presented, so Holmes had little
trouble in affirming the conviction.
The main basis of the attack on Holmes for neglecting his own
test and improperly affirming a conviction was the Debs case. The
speeches for which Debs was convicted did not directly urge the vio
lation of any law, and no one was shown to have broken any law
because of the speeches.382 Further, unlike the circulars in Schenck,
the speeches were directed to a general audience instead of being
targeted to draftees.3 83 And, unlike Shewalter in Frohwerk, Debs'
attorneys had preserved for review the full record of the trial with all
the circumstances that surrounded the speeches.38 '
Several preliminary points had already been settled in the previous cases-the constitutionality of applying the Espionage Act to
speech had been affirmed in Schenck, and the sufficiency of an indictment that alleged a conspiracy to violate the statute through an379.
380.
381.
TERS 190
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 207.
Id. at 209.
Letter from Holmes to Laski (March 16, 1919), reprintedin 1 HOLMEs-LASKI LET(M. Howe ed. 1953).
Debs, 249 U.S. at 213-14.
Id. at 212.
See generally Record, Debs.
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tiwar and antidraft statements had been decided in Frohwerk. Thus
these issues were quickly and properly disposed of in Debs.385 Debs
also claimed that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of the
convictions under the Act of other persons and of the "Anti-war
Proclamation and Program" adopted in St. Louis by the Socialist
Party, which called for "continuous, active, and public opposition to
the war, through demonstrations, mass petitions, and all other means
within our power. ' 38 8 Holmes dismissed this claim by finding that
both matters were relevant to Debs' intent, for the speeches specifically referred to the persons tried and Debs had stated shortly before
making the speeches that he approved the St. Louis platform.38 7 One
troublesome issue thus remained: Whether the speeches were a clear
and present danger to carrying out conscription.
Professor Chafee later criticized Holmes' opinion on the ground
that the trial judge's charge permitted the jury to find Debs guilty on
the basis of a presumed intent to obstruct the draft-an intent presumed from the tendency of the words to have that effect.388 Concern over the substance of the judge's charge, however, was not central to Debs' attorneys. Indeed, the original assignment of exceptions
made no mention of the charge except for the failure to direct a
verdict. An amended assignment of errors did include the failure to
sustain an objection to the judge's charge as a whole, and to several
portions of it in particular. Nevertheless, even in the amended assignment of errors, the defendants did not focus on the judge's discussion of presumed intent. Thus the government was able to state in
its brief:
The question of the defendant's intent or purpose-that is, the issue between the Government's charge of unlawful purpose and the
defendant's defense, of lawful purpose, was placed by the court
before the jury in a manner so clear and fair to the defendant that
he does not and could not complain of the charge in this respect.3 89
The judge had charged the jury that a person is presumed to intend
385. 249 U.S. at 215.
386. Id. at 215-16.
387. Id. Holmes passed over rather quickly the gap between opposition to the war by all
means as stated in the St. Louis platform and finding a specific intent in a speech to oppose it
by means of obstructing the draft. He simply said: "The principle is too well established and
too manifestly good sense to need citation of the books." Id. at 216. Nevertheless, this point
was not mentioned in Freund or Chafee's critiques. See Freund, supra note 369; Chafee, supra
note 369.
388. Chafee, supra note 369, at 968.
389. U.S. Debs Brief, supra note 288, at 75.
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the natural and probable consequences of his words.390 Chafee later
argued that this allows juries to find culpable intent from a general
discussion of the evils of a law because any criticism of a law may
encourage persons to disregard it. 91 Neither Debs nor the government, however, argued or even mentioned any such problem in the
briefs. Instead, the government quoted at length the following portions of the charge that consistently reiterated the protected character of statements of opposition to the war:
In passing upon the question of specific intent, I wish to say
something additional thereto. Disapproval of war is, of course, not
a crime, nor is the advocacy of peace a crime under this law, unless
the words or utterances by which the expression or advocacy is conveyed shall have been willfully intended by the person making
them to commit the acts forbidden by this law, and, further, not
even then unless the natural and reasonably probable tendency and
effect of such words and language as he may use will have the
effect and consequences forbidden by the law.
If the conscious purpose of the defendant was only to state the
truth as he saw it, to convey information to his fellow citizens, with
the object only of bringing about the reconstruction or reshapement, by peaceful, ordinary methods, of the national policy in accordance with what he believed to be the right and correct view of
the national policy, and that he did not, in so doing, have the intent
willfully to do any of the prohibited acts, he would not, in that
event, be guilty, and it would be your duty also, to return a verdict
of not guilty.392
Holmes' opinion picked up on this portion of the charge:
[T]he jury were most carefully instructed that they could not find
the defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions unless the
words used had as their natural tendency and reasonably probable
effect to obstruct the recruiting service, &c., and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do so in his mind. 93
Shortly after the Debs decision, Judge Learned Hand wrote
Holmes about that case. He suggested that the appropriate test for
protection of speech is whether "the words were directly an incite390.
391.
392.
393.

Record at 279-80, Debs.
Chafee, supra note 369, at 965-68.
U.S. Debs Brief, supra note 288, at 75-77 (quoting from Record at 278-79).
249 U.S. at 216.
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ment." 394 He added, "it is very questionable whether the test of motive is not a dangerous test. Juries won't much regard the difference
between 9the
probable result of the words and the purposes of the
35
utterer.
Holmes replied that the intent of the speaker was not the only
test that he used in determining the limits of freedom of speech:
As to intent under the Espionage Act I believe I have said nothing
except to note that under the instructions the jury must be taken to
have found that Debs's speech was intended to obstruct and tended
to obstruct-and except further that evidence was held admissible
as bearing on intent. Even if absence of intent might not be a defense I suppose that the presence of it might be material. 396

Holmes then said that he did not understand how Hand's test differed from the one that Holmes had announced in Schenck-"clear
and present danger. 3 9 7 In this context, it is clear that Holmes believed himself to be applying the clear and present danger test in
Debs, and that, as in his general analysis of attempt, he believed that
certain acts are more dangerous if the actor intends them to be steps
towards the violation of the law than the same act would be without
such intent.398 In Holmes' view, the proper test for the power of the
government to punish speech was the danger posed by that speech,
and intent was relevant only insofar as it increased the danger of
394. Letter from Hand to Holmes (late March 1919), reprintedin Gunther, supra note
17, at 758.
395. Id. at 759.
396. Letter from Holmes to Hand (April 3, 1919), reprintedin Gunther, supra note 17,
at 759.
397. I don't see how you differ from the test as stated by me [in] Schenck v. U.S.
(March 3, 1919). "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree."
Id. at 760. It is plain from this note to Learned Hand that Holmes understood the clear and
present danger test to be appropriately used in the Debs case.
398. Where an aim of speech is to produce criminal conduct, it is appropriate to find the
words present a greater danger than those same words spoken without the improper aim for
two reasons. First, the speaker's aim indicates that he foresaw the harm would flow from his
words. This is some evidence that the speech is, in fact, dangerous. Further, where the
speaker's aim is to bring about a result forbidden by the law, it is appropriate for the law to
discourage him. The analogy to attempt here may be Holmes' example of shooting at a block
of wood; the act is not so inherently dangerous as to give rise to a need to prevent it (although
the potential of accidental injury in target shooting always exists), but where the shooter believes the block to be a human being, it may be appropriate to create a standard of conduct
which forbids it "in order to make discouragement broad enough and easy to understand."
THe COMMON LAW, supra note 325, at 70.
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violation of law proceeding from the speech. He saw no difference
between his test and Hand's "direct incitement" because he thought
words that posed a clear and present danger, that were close to the
illegal action, would surely be "directly an incitement" even if their
form was not that of direct incitement.39 9 As long as Hand was willing to acknowledge that an indirect form of words (like Mark
Antony's speech) could be punished as a direct incitement, a jury
rabid to convict would find the defendant guilty under Hand's standard as easily as under Holmes'. What Holmes failed to appreciate
was the greater scope Hand's test might give the trial judge (or reviewing court) for finding that the verdict should be directed for the
defendant. Hand's test focused solely on the language of the speaker
as it would be understood by a reasonable person in the circumstances in which it was given.400

Hand's letter to Holmes states, "I haven't a doubt that Debs
was guilty under any rule conceivably applicable.' 0 1 It is possible
that Hand was simply trying to soften Holmes up to be more receptive to his argument.0 Nevertheless, when Debs told the jury "I
399. In Debs, Holmes said that the general theme of the promotion of socialism would
not protect the speech if in passages in the speech "encouragement was directly given" to
obstruct the recruiting service. 249 U.S. at 213. Thus it would appear that Holmes thought a
jury could find direct incitement even in Debs' speech.
400. Under Hand's test, if a reasonable man in the audience would not understand that
the speaker wanted him to commit a specific illegal act, the speaker would not be liable although the speech in fact incited the audience to violence and the speaker was aware that the
speech would have that result. Holmes would find the speaker could be deterred from a speech
that created an unacceptable risk of harm despite the speaker's lack of the forbidden purpose.
Hand complains of Holmes' use of motive because he fears a focus on subjective motive will
permit the jury to find one that is not there, while Holmes' use of motive is tied to the dangerousness. Hand's focus is on speaker responsibility and audience autonomy while Holmes' is on
state interest in deterring danger.
This disparity has another, more complex strand in that Hand may have been emphasizing responsibility as statutory construction while Holmes assumed that a statute is pressed to a
constitutional limit. Hand's constitutional interpretation in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201, 212 (1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), is clearly derived from Holmes' common law
attempt background to the clear and present danger test.
As had been noted, Hand believed his test was a more effective protection from jury
emotions, supra notes 316-17, 394-95 and accompanying text. Further, Hand's test could have
affected the relevancy of the St. Louis platform. The platform was relevant to Debs' subjective
intent and Hand's test disclaims inquiry into motive. Nevertheless, it might be argued that a
purpose to incite is itself probative on the issue of the capacity of the words to be a "direct"
incitement. Even if marginally relevant, their prejudicial effect could outweigh any probative
value. See Quint, Toward FirstAmendment Limitations on the Introductionof Evidence: The
Problem of United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622 (1977).
401. Letter from Hand to Holmes (late March, 1919), reprintedin Gunther, supra note
17, at 758.
402. See Gunther, supra note 17, at 739.
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have been accused of obstructing the war. I admit it,"'403 it might
have struck Judge Hand that the speeches Debs made were indeed a
direct incitement to obstruct the war despite the indirection of the
language. Thus, Hand may have been candid in stating that his only
objection was to the standards used by the judge in the charge and
by Holmes in approving it.
The core of Debs' argument was that he should have been given
a directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to convict
him under any standard consistent with the first amendment. Considering the indirection of the speech, this argument has some merit.
In a letter, Holmes himself said, "I think it quite possible that if I
had been on the jury I should have been for acquittal. ' 4o4 Chafee
and Ernst Freund in separate law review articles- argued that Debs
could not be convicted under any test that squared with the first
amendment.4 0 5 Finally, Justice Brandeis, who had joined the unanimous opinion of the Court in all three cases, subsequently indicated
that he thought the cases should have been put under the war power
for they did not fit his conception of the proper meaning of the clear
and present danger test. 06
The nature of these cases as ones of first impression 407 caused
Holmes to be more deferential to the jury. Holmes believed, as has
403. 249 U.S. at 214.
404. Letter from Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919) (enclosed with a letter from
Holmes to Laski (May 13, 1919)), reprintedin I HOLMES-LASKI LETERs 202-03 (M.Howe
ed. 1953). Holmes statd: "Yesterday I wrote the within and decided not to send it as some
themes may become burning. Instead I trust it confidentially to you." Letter from Holmes to
Laski (May 13, 1919), reprintedin 1 HOLMES-LASKI LErras 202-03.
405. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
406. I have never been quite happy about my concurrence in the Debs and Schenck
cases, I had not then thought the issues of freedom of speech out-I thought at the
subject, not through it. Not until I came to write the Pierce and Schaeffer cases did
I understand it. I would have placed the Debs case on the war power-instead of
taking Holmes' line about "clear and present danger." Put it frankly on the war
power-like the Hamilton case (251 U.S.)-and then the scope of espionage legislation would be confined to war. But in peace the protection against restrictions on
freedom of speech would be unabated. You might as well recognize that during a
warF.F.: All bets are off.
L.D.B.: Yes, all bets are off. But we would have a clear line to go on. I didn't know
enough in the early cases to put it on that ground.
Conversation between Felix Frankfurter and Louis Brandeis in the Frankfurter Papers at 23
(Aug. 8, 1921) (available at Harvard Law School Library Manuscript Room, copy on file at
Hofstra Law Review).
407. This contributed to Brandeis' unhappiness with his concurrence. "Of course you
must also remember that when Holmes writes, he doesn't give a fellow a chance-he shoots so
quickly." Id.
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been seen in his view of attempt, that where experience had built up,
the judge would sometimes be in a better position to determine
which acts were innocent and which were not.40 Several factors
combined in the Debs case to make Holmes believe that case more
appropriate for a jury.
The most obvious factor that would lead Holmes to believe that
a jury could legitimately find that a clear and present danger existed
in Debs was the apprehension of great danger. The draft and recruiting service were being interfered with in wartime-thus, the normal
self-interested reluctance of an individual to join the armed services
was sharply reinforced at the very time when the need for soldiers
was greatest. "When people are putting out all their energies in battle I don't think it unreasonable to say we won't have obstacles intentionally put in the way of raising troops-by persuasion any more
than by force. "409 The Civil War veteran was likely to remember
clearly the draft riots in New York City when Lincoln began
conscription.410
In addition, Holmes apparently regarded Debs personally as a
more serious threat to conscription than the other defendants. Debs'
notoriety-as labor leader and presidential candidate--combined
with his skill as a speaker, made it far more likely that his audience
would be stirred to action by his speech (again, the Marc Antony
analogy seems apt). Holmes also seemed to have little sympathy
41
with the man. He described Debs to Pollock as "a noted agitator"
and in a subsequent letter told Pollock "I hope the President will
pardon him and some other poor devils with whom I have more sympathy." 4112 As a judge on the Massachusetts court 1 3 and on the Supreme Court 414 he had earned a pro-labor reputation, which might
408. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 325, at 123.
409. Letter from Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919) (enclosed in letter from
Holmes to Laski (May 13, 1919)), reprintedin I HoLMEs-LAsKI LNEwRrs 202, 203-04 (M.
Howe ed. 1953).
410. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
411. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (April 5, 1919), reprinted in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETrERs 7 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
412. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (April 27, 1919), reprintedin id. at 11.
413. See Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 108 (1896) (Holmes, J.,dissenting), and
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 505 (1900) (Holmes, J.,dissenting). Speaking to Pollock on
the reaction to his nomination to the Supreme Court, Holmes writes discontentedly, "they
don't know much more than that I took the labor side in Vegelahn v. Gunther." Holmes to
Pollock (Feb. (Sept?) 23, 1902), reprintedin 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS 106 (M. Howe ed.
1941).
414. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (Holmes, J.,dissenting) are two of the cases in which
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appear to indicate that he would be more likely to sympathize with
Debs; the reputation, however, was based on Holmes' willingness to
permit the "free struggle for life,"41 5 as he termed it, and legislation
that fostered labor's position. His personal conviction was that all
such strife was futile and merely shifted the burdens of poverty from
one poor person to another.'1
As Holmes viewed Debs' disputed speech, it could be understood as "directly"'4117 encouraging obstruction of the recruiting service. Debs praised three persons who had been convicted of aiding
and abetting another in failing to register for the draft and said they
were paying the penalty for "standing erect." He said "the subject
class has always fought the battles-that the subject class has had
nothing to gain and all to lose, including their lives.' 1 8 His final
exhortation was: "Don't worry about the charge of treason to your
masters; but be concerned about the treason that involves yourselves.' 419 This telescoping of the speech makes it more suggestive
than the actual oration by Debs, but it was, Holmes thought, possible for the speech to encourage listeners to obstruct the draft.
This view would be even more likely if the words were uttered
for that purpose. On that point, Holmes thought that Debs' statement that "he had to be prudent and might not be able to say all
that he thought"'420 provided a basis for finding that he intimated to
his hearers "that they might infer that he meant more."' 2' How
much more could be found in his subscription to the St. Louis Program which called for public opposition to the war through "all
other means within our power. "422
Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine that a court would find the
speech a clear and present danger or even a jury question today.' 23 It
would be misleading, however, to assume that Holmes' later dissents
using the clear and present danger test signaled a revision in his
views on the correctness of the result in Debs. Since the test was
Holmes was hailed for a position which coincided with the interests of labor.
415. Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 107 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
416. See Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 505 (1900).
417. 249 U.S. at 214-16.
418. Id. at 213.
419. Id. at 214.
420. Id. at 213.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 216.
423. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (emphasizing the need for incitement to imminent unlawful acts to uphold a speechrelated conviction).
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derived from his understanding of attempt, he included in his analysis in Debs the seriousness of the danger and the apprehension felt
by the community as well as the proximity of the act to the proscribed harm.42 ' Holmes later said, in Abrams, that "[p]ublishing
those opinions for the very purpose of obstructing however, might
indicate a greater danger and at any rate would have the quality of
an attempt. So I assume that the second leaflet if published for the
purposes alleged in the fourth count might be punishable."' 425 That
is, the very same words for which Abrams was convicted in the case
which elicited Holmes' great dissent would be punishable, according
to that dissent, if uttered with intent to interfere with the war
effort.426
In sum, Holmes' understanding of his own phrase was rooted in
the considerations he used to define attempts. Speech that could induce unlawful acts, when engaged in for that purpose under circumstances where the danger was extreme, satisfied this "clear and present danger" test. All of the convictions in the spring of 1919
involved persons of some prominence within a relevant community, 427 challenging the war and conscription in the middle of the
war with statements urging their listeners or readers to take some
action 428 and jury findings (either actual 2 9 or assumed, 4 but based
on sufficient evidence) that the language was intended to obstruct
and capable of doing so. Thus Holmes reasonably believed that, applying his test to the issues presented him, the convictions in
Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs were properly upheld.
This fact is important to keep in mind during the forthcoming
examination of Abrams.43 1 It will allow the reader to understand
that the differences between the Espionage Act opinions and the leg424. See supra notes 345-48 and accompanying text.

425.

250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).

426.

Id. at 627-28 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

427. Schenck and Baer were ranking officials in the Communist party, Shewalter had
been a local judge, Frohwerk was a newspaper publisher, and Debs, of course, had received

almost a million votes as Socialist candidate for the Presidency.
428. In Schenck- "'Assert Your Rights,'" 249 U.S. at 51; in Frohwerk: "Who then, it
is asked, will pronounce a verdict of guilty upon him if he stops reasoning and follows the first
impulse of nature: self-preservation," 249 U.S. at 208 and in Debs: "Don't worry about the
charge of treason to your masters." 249 U.S. at 214.

429. In Debs, Holmes emphasized that the jury made appropriate findings under a correct charge, 249 U.S. at 216, while in Schenck the same appears to be true, see 249 U.S. at

49, but the charge is not clearly attacked or set forth in Holmes' opinion.
430. See the discussion of Frohwerk, supra text accompanying notes 376-81.
431. See infra notes 432-513 and accompanying text.
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endary dissent in Abrams, both in tone and in result, are not due to
a major change in Holmes' view of the first amendment between
Debs and Abrams. Instead, as the next section demonstrates, the
change in result can be explained by important factual differences
between the early cases and Abrams, and the change in tone and
fervor were the result not of new thinking but rather of frustration at
critics' misunderstanding of the strides made in Schenck and strong
desire to reiterate the change.
XIII. THE Abrams

DISSENT

"I regret that I cannot put into more impressive words my belief that in their conviction upon this indictment the defendants
were deprived of their rights under the Constitution of the United
States."' 32
The first world war was over by the end of 1918, but the intolerance for unpopular opinions which it had stimulated did not have
such a swift termination. A move was afoot among some alumni of
Harvard to get rid of Dean Pound and Holmes' friend, Felix Frankfurter.33 In September, the Boston police went on strike, a strike
that was quickly crushed. 4 " Harold Laski publicly criticized the
conduct of the chief of police during the strike, and he soon found
himself in trouble.43 5 Thus, between the date of the Debs decision

and the argument in Abrams, several of Holmes' friends had been
subjected to critical attack and threatened with the loss of their jobs
for unpopular opinions they held.
In addition to private intolerance, the government was engaging
in its share of repressive measures. 3 6 Postmaster General Burleson
acted with severity and poor judgment in banning antiwar material
from the mail. 37 In May of 1919, William Hard wrote an article in
432. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 631 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
433. "I had a dear little letter from Pound. . .saying that people there want to push
Frankfurter out of the school. He says nothing about himself but I have been led to fear that
the push extends to Pound." Letter from Holmes to Laski (June 1, 1919), reprinted in 1
HOLMEs-LAsKI LarrRS 210 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
434. See letter from Holmes to Laski (October 26, 1919), reprinted in id. at 217.
435. "1 infer that you have had trouble, I hope not serious, because of your criticism of
Curtis. . . I fear we have less freedom of speech here than they have in England." Id.
436. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 10, at 97-100.
437. See United States ex rel Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 417, 436 (1921) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting in separate opinions)
(dissenting from the Court's affirmance of the Postmaster General's exclusion of the Milwaukee Leader from the mail rates for second class matter).
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the New Republic criticizing Mr. Burleson. 3 8 The sentiments on
free speech contained in the article tempted Holmes to write:
I do not know enough of the details of public affairs to have opinions about Mr. Burleson's conduct of his office but the general aspects of the article so stirred my sympathies that I want to express
them. As long ago as 1908 when I wrote Harriman v. ICC, 211
U.S. 407 it seemed to me that we so long had enjoyed the advantages protected by bills of rights that we had forgotten-it used
sometimes to seem to me that the New Republic had forgotten-that they had had to be fought for and could not be kept
unless we were willing to fight for them. Few can sympathize more
than I do
with Mr. Hard's general way of thinking on the
49
subject. 3
Burleson's high-handed actions in the executive branch were
matched by Congress which, in May of 1919, referred to a Committee of the House the question whether to expel representative Victor
Berger from the House, because he had been convicted under the
Espionage Act.440 The ease in securing such a conviction must have
been evident to Holmes, for in October of 1919 the Court not only
had the Abrams case but also had received briefs and heard argument in Schaefer v. United States,441 where a few small mistranslations from German sources442 were the basis for a substantial prison
443
sentence.
Thus, when Holmes began the October 1919 term, he was
aware of the substantial current of intolerance of unpopular opinion
both public and private, and this intolerance even touched the lives
of his friends. It created an environment in which a strong statement
on behalf of freedom of opinion was earnestly desired.
Holmes was also influenced to make such a statement by the
criticism he had received after -the Debs case. The first response he
received was from Harold Laski, who indicated his respect:
"[T]hough I say it with deep regret they [the Schenck, Frohwerk
and Debs opinions] are very convincing. ' 444 Nevertheless, Laski was
438.
439.
Holmes to
ed. 1953).
440.
441.

See Hard, Mr. Burleson, Espionagent THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 10, 1919, at 42.
Letter from Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919) (enclosed with a letter from
Laski (May 13, 1919)), reprintedin 1 HoLmES-LASKM LETTERS 202-03. (M. Howe
See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 10, at 247-52.
251 U.S. 466 (1920).

442. Id. at 473.
443. Id. at 482.

444. Letter from Laski to Holmes (March 18, 1919), reprintedin 1 HoLMEs-LASKI LET-
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not satisfied: "[I]n the remarks you make in the Schenck case I am
not sure that I should not have liked the line to be drawn a little
tighter about executive discretion. '445 A way that the line might be
drawn tighter was suggested by Learned Hand near the end of the
month as he urged Holmes to accept the direct incitement test of
Masses.4 8 Soon the protests from private individuals without legal
training came pouring in against the Debs decision in such profusion
that Holmes remarked about it in letters to Laski,447 Lewis Einstein 8 and Sir Frederick Pollock.449
Criticism took a more serious turn at the very end of April. A
young clerk in the post office discovered a number of packages containing bombs sent to prominent people in the United States. 450 The
packages had been held aside because of insufficient postage.451 One
of these packages was addressed to Justice Holmes. 45 2 The attempt
on his life brought sympathy from Holmes' friends, but its main effect on Holmes was to make clear to him that he personally was
viewed as the embodiment of repression as a result of the Espionage
Act opinions he had written for the Court. His first response was a
cool note in a letter to Laski: "I suppose it was the Debs incident
that secured me the honor of being among those destined to receive
an explosive machine, stopped in the Post Office as you may [have]
seen. It shows a want of intelligence in the senders." 453 In May, he
191 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
445. Id.
446. See supra notes 394-403 and accompanying text.
447. "I confess, having had early experience with come-outers, to a general disbelief in
them, as embodying the cock-sureness of semi-education. I might say the same of a labor
union that yesterday sent me a protest against the Debs decision, at once cocksure and hopelessly ignorant of all about it." Letter from Holmes to Laski (April 4, 1919), reprinted in 1
HOLMEs-LAsKI LETTERS 193, 194 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
448. Just now I am receiving some singularly ignorant protests against a decision
that I wrote sustaining a conviction of Debs, a labor agitator, for obstructing the
recruiting service. They make me want to write a letter to ease my mind, and shoot
off my mouth; but of course I keep a judicial silence.
Letter from Holmes to Einstein (April 5, 1919) reprinted in HOLMEs-EINSTEIN LETTERs 184
(J. Peabody ed. 1964).
449. "I am beginning to get stupid letters of protest against a decision that Debs, a
noted agitator, was rightly convicted of obstructing the recruiting service as far as the law was
concerned." Letter from Holmes to Pollock (April 5, 1919), reprinted in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK
LmERs 7 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
450. R. MURRAY, RED SCARE 70-71 (1955).
451. Id. at 70.
452. Id. at 71.
453. Letter from Holmes to Laski (May 1, 1919), reprinted in 1 HOLMES-LASKi LETTERS 199 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
TERS
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was responding to letters on the subject-Holmes wrote Lewis
Einstein:
As you say or intimate if the senders knew how I think and feel
perhaps they wouldn't have wanted to blow me up. I have said several times it brought home to me what, if we don't read into it
what is not there, seems to me the greatest saying of antiquitythe words on the Cross: "They know not what they do."" 4
In October, just as he was hearing the Abrams case argued, Holmes
still reflected on the bombing incident--"It is one of the ironies," he
wrote Pollock, "that I, who probably take the extremist view in favor
of free speech, (in which, in the abstract, I have no very enthusiastic
belief, though I hope I would die for it), that I should have been
455
selected for blowing up."
Holmes also reacted strongly to the more literate criticism of
Ernst Freund which appeared in the New Republic in May of
1919.416 Freund appeared to advocate a standard of "direct provocation. 457 The professor from Chicago wrote:
To know what you may do and what you may not do, and how far
you may go in criticism, is the first condition of political liberty; to
be permitted to agitate at your own peril, subject to a jury's guessing at motive, tendency and
possible effect, makes the right of free
speech a precarious gift.458
He added, "Justice Holmes takes the very essentials of the entire
problem for granted. 459
Harold Laski asked Holmes if he had read Freund's piece and if
he was "at all influenced by his analysis. '460 Holmes' reply was to
enclose a letter he had written to Herbert Croly, the managing editor of the New Republic, but which he decided not to send because
some of the "themes may become burning. '461 With respect to
Freund's remarks on the need for a fixed line, Holmes replied
454. Letter from Holmes to Einstein (May 22, 1919), reprinted in HOLMES-EINSTEIN
LETrERS 186 (J. Peabody ed. 1964).

455. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (October 26, 1919), reprinted in 2 HoLMES-PoLLOCK LETTER 27, 29 (M. Howe ed. 1941).

456.

Freund, supra note 369.

457.

Id. at 14.

458. Id.
459.

Id.

460. Letter from Laski to Holmes (May 11, 1919), reprintedin 1 HoLmEs-LASKi LETTEaS 200, 202 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
461.

Letter from Holmes to Laski (May 13, 1919), reprintedin id. at 202.
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"Freund's objection to a jury 'guessing at motive, tendency and possible effect' is an objection to pretty much the whole body of the law,
which for thirty years I have made my brethren smile by insisting to
be everywhere a matter of degree. 4 62 He then quoted from an earlier opinion of his: "'the law is full of instances where a man's fate
depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently
estimates it, from matters of degree.' "463 The reply is noteworthy,
even if it was never sent, because it demonstrates that the criticism
of his decisions in Debs and Schenck evoked a strong defensive reaction in Holmes.
Later that summer, Holmes was subjected to yet another informed critique. 4 Unlike Hand and Freund, however, Professor
Chafee did not take direct issue with Holmes' legal standard.46 5 He
seemed to prefer the direct incitement test of Hand, but he emphasized only that the base line should be a real peril to the public
safety and that Holmes' test properly applied could be satisfactory.466 Unlike Freund, Chafee praised Holmes as a judge,67 yet he
insisted that Debs was wrongly decided.46 After the article was published, Laski had Holmes to tea with Chafee. Concerning that meeting, Holmes wrote Pollock, "[iln the few minutes talk I had with
him a year ago he seemed unusually pleasant and intelligent. ' 469
462. Letter from Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919) (enclosed with a letter from
Holmes to Laski (May 13, 1919)) reprinted in id. at 202-03. Holmes consistently urged that
the nature of every act depends on the circumstances under which it is done. If a test of
"direct provocation" or "manifest incitement" insulates from punishment any form of speech
that does not literally request the hearer to engage in illegal action, speakers will be encouraged to promote criminal acts by irony and indirection. "You know I cannot tell you what
to do," such a speaker might tell a crowd at a draft board, "but I can tell you that this law is
evil and is used by evil men with an evil purpose." If a campaign to encourage criminal acts
through indirect incitement stands a chance of success, Holmes would not find government
powerless to deal with it. A mechanical rule which insulates criticism of laws regardless of the
circumstances in which they are uttered violates basic principles of self-preservation. A standard which takes context into account is likely to be "a matter of degree."
Freund argued that Debs "must have known. . . his power to create actual obstruction to
a compulsory draft was practically nil, and he could hardly have intended what he could not
hope to achieve." Freund, supra note 369, at 14. Holmes did not seem quite as sanguine about
Debs. See supra text accompanying notes 409-22.
463. Letter from Holmes to Croly (May 12, 1919) (enclosed with a letter from Holmes
to Laski (May 13, 1919)), reprinted in 1 HOLMEs-LASKI L'rrERs 202, 203 (quoting Nash v.
U.S., 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913)).
464. Chafee, supra note 369.
465. See Id. at 967-69.
466. See Id. at 968-69.
467. Id. at 955.
468. Id. at 967-69.
469. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (June 21, 1920), reprinted in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK
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Perhaps one of the intelligent aspects of Chafee's connection with
Holmes was a reiteration of the final phrases of his article---"it is
regrettable that Justice Holmes did nothing to emphasize the social
interest behind free speech, and show the need of balancing even in
47 0
war time.
Even in April of 1919, Holmes referred to freedom of speech in
Schenck as being "dealt with somewhat summarily." 471 Under the
pressure of criticism from people he felt misunderstood him and encouragement to explain himself, Holmes was ready and perhaps even
anxious to more fully state his beliefs on freedom 6f speech. The
opportunity came in late October of 1919 when a new case under the
Espionage Act of 1918 reached the Court. As John Lord O'Brien
has written:
In the spring of 1918 the Attorney General sought minor
amendments of the Espionage Law, chiefly to protect more adequately Liberty Loan solicitation against interference by disaffected persons. As a result and without his approval Congress enacted the so-called Second Espionage Act, which was of such
a
47 2
sweeping character as to be a distinct threat to civil Liberty.
The new statute added attempts to the prohibition against obstructing the recruiting service and made unlawful the saying or doing anything with intent to obstruct the sale of United States bonds,
except by way of bona fide and not disloyal advice.47 3 It made it a
crime to utter, print, write or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language or language intended to cause contempt,
scorn, contumely or-disrepute as regards the form of government of
the United States; or the Constitution; or the flag; or the uniform of
the Army or Navy; or any language intended to incite resistance to
the United States or promote the cause of its enemies. 4 The statute
LETrERS 45.

The casual references to "a few minutes talk" make it unlikely that the conversation resulted in a sudden conversion of Holmes to a significantly different point of view, despite
the intimations of Professor Ragan in Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and PresentDanger Test for FreeSpeech: The First Year, 1919, 58
J. AM. HisT. 24, 43 (1971).
470. Chafee, supra note 369, at 968.
471. "There was a lot of jaw about free speech, which I dealt with somewhat summarily
in an earlier case-Schenck v. U.S. ... " Letter from Holmes to Pollock (April 5, 1919),
reprintedin 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 7 (M. Howe ed. 1941) (editor's footnote omitted).
472. O'Brian, Changing Aspects of Freedom: The Government and Civil Liberties:
World War I and After, reprinted in JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER LECTURES 153 (1952).
473. See 40 Stat. 553 (1918). The text of this statute is set out in note 199.
474. Id.
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also forbade words or acts supporting or favoring the cause of any
country at war with us, or opposing the cause of the United States
therein.4 75 Advocating, teaching, defending or suggesting any of the
above was a criminal offense.47 6 In short, any criticism of the United
States appeared to be made a criminal offense.
The unique character of the Espionage Act of 1918 in condemning contempt for the form of government was the most serious attack
on criticism of government and democratic theory in the history of
the nation. Not even the majority in Abrams was willing to state
They were repealed in
that such provisions were constitutional.
478
Yet Abrams was convicted,
1921 along with the entire 1918 Act.
among other things, of violating that section of the Act. 479
The Government, in arguing Abrams, pressed the constitutionality of the Act of 1918 based in part on the propriety of the Alien
and Sedition Acts.4 80 The government had made the same argument
in the reply brief in Debs, but in the context of attempting to show
that the petitioner's theory of the first amendment was wrong. Here,
the Alien and Sedition Acts were used as the basis for a theory of
the first amendment in which it might be legitimate to attempt to
point out flaws in the government but it would be impermissible to
attempt to bring the government into contempt.
The sacredness of any existing set of ideas had never appealed
to the skeptical Holmes. 81 Once he was convinced that the first
amendment to the Constitution was designed to overthrow Blackstone and install a limit to the power of government to punish opinions, the argument that government could not suppress dissenting
views-an argument he had heard in various philosophical forms
throughout his life-had a powerful appeal.
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the
First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force.
History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that the
United States through many years had shown its repentance for
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. 250 U.S. at 624. See text accompanying note 489.
478. 41 Stat. 1360 (1921).
479. 250 U.S. at 616-17.
480. See Brief for the United States at 17-25, Abrams.
481. "1am so sceptical as to our knowledge about the goodness or badness of laws that I
have no practical criticism except what the crowd wants." Letter from Holmes to Pollock
(April 23, 1910), reprinted in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LErERs 163 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
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the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it imposed."82
Abrams and his fellows were also tried for violating the section
of the statute which forbade urging any curtailment of production of
any things necessary to the prosecution of the war with intent to
hinder its prosecution. 488 The basis for these charges was the distribution of circulars which attacked the President's action in sending
troops to the Soviet Union and repeated "Awake! Awake! you Workers of the World!'' They called the United States capitalistic and
condemned capitalism. A second leaflet written in Yiddish complained that the United States was attempting to destroy not only
the Germans, but also the Russian revolution. These Russian aliens
protested, "Workers in the ammunition factories, you are producing
bullets, bayonnets, cannon, to murder not only the Germans, but also
your dearest, best, who are in Russia and are fighting for freedom. 4 85 It continued "Workers, our reply to the barbarian intervention has to be a general strike!"'4 8 Finally, a writing which was not
distributed stated "in order to save the Russian revolution, we must
8
keep the armies of the allied countries busy at home.' 7
The majority opinion upheld the convictions, finding it unnecessary to consider the validity of the two counts for disloyal utterances
about the form of government of the United States and for using
language calculated to bring the form of government into contempt,
because conviction on the other two counts was appropriate.48 8
[TIhe manifest purpose of such a publication was to create an attempt to defeat the war plans of the Government of the United
States, by bringing upon the country the paralysis of a general
munitions and other
strike, thereby arresting the production of all
8
things essential to the conduct of the war.4
The majority emphasized the danger to be feared from these articles
by noting they were "circulated in the greatest port of our land,
from which great numbers of soldiers were at the time taking ship
daily, and in which great quantities of war supplies of every kind
482.

250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J.,dissenting).

483. 250 U.S. at 617.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

250 U.S. at 620.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 622.
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were at the time being manufactured for transportation overseas.
Thus, the Court concluded,

'4 0

the language of these circulars was obviously intended to provoke
and to encourage resistance to the United States in the war, as the
third count runs, and, the defendants, in terms, plainly urged and
advocated a resort to a general strike of workers in ammunition
factories for the purpose of curtailing the production of ordnance
and munitions necessary and essential
to the prosecution of the war
491
as is charged in the fourth count.
The facts of Abrams, however, provide a stark contrast to the
cases that had been decided in the spring term. The defendants were
little known aliens who had come to this country from Russia. The
material was not distributed to large crowds or newspaper subscribers or sent directly to draftees but "[the circulars were distributed
some by throwing them from a window of a building where one of
the defendants
was employed and others secretly in New York
City.' 49 2 Where Debs and Frohwerk addressed significant sympathetic groups and Schenck addressed his message to persons who
might respond from self-interest, Abrams and his codefendants scattered to the winds a message, in a foreign language, that no one had
a personal interest in accepting. Thus, despite the majority's strong
emphasis on the supposed great danger caused by the Abrams
materials, Abrams presents a far weaker case for upholding this conviction than any of the previous cases.
The majority of the Court, in arguably exaggerating the danger,
may have been influenced by the rash of strikes that had swept the
country during the year. These began with the Seattle general strike
inJanuary of 1919493 and included the police strike in September
which helped make Coolidge a household word 44 and got Laski in
trouble. 4' Further, the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) inaugurated a strike in the steel industry just as the briefs in the
Abrams case were submitted to the Court. 9 Concern over crippling
strikes and particularly over the violent tendencies of some radicals,
as demonstrated by the bombing incidents over the summer, may
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.

Id.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 618.
See R. MURRAY, supra note 450, at 59.
See generally Id. at 122-34 (discussing Boston police strike).
See supra note 435 and accompanying text.
See R. MURRAY, supra note 450, at 140.

HeinOnline -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 182 1982-19832

1982]

HOLMES AND FREE SPEECH

have made the Court majority overly concerned by Abrams' message
and less willing to heed counterarguments.
Holmes' perspective was somewhat different. He had long held
the view that self-interest was the basic motivating factor in man.4
Even if he had not, he surely would have been willing to listen to
Brandeis explain that men strike to have a say in their working conditions and that those conditions were the nucleus of every strike
that had occurred in the country.4 98 The American worker has never
responded to general idealism but rather asked, in the words of Samuel Gompers, for "More!"'4 99 Thus, Holmes would have doubted
that the workers exposed to Abrams' leaflets would have been moved
to strike for purely idealistic reasons.
In addition, despite what he had felt was the legal propriety of
upholding the earlier convictions, Holmes had been upset by the
prosecutions in the earlier cases and stated to his friends that the
sentences there should be sharply reduced and commuted by the
President. 500 The overreaction of the judges and juries that he perceived in those cases, though, was mild compared to the fervor exhibited against the Abrams defendants in sentencing them to a
twenty year imprisonment. Holmes wrote:
Even if I am technically wrong, and enough can be squeezed from
these poor and puny anonymities to turn the color of legal litmus
paper; I will add, even if what I think the necessary intent were
shown; the most nominal punishment seems to me all that possibly
could be inflicted, unless the defendants are to be made to suffer
not for0 1 what the indictment alleges but for the creed that they
5
avow.

497. "[A]t the bottom of all private relations, however tempered by sympathy and all
the social feelings, is a justifiable self-preference." THE COMMON LAW, supra note 325, at 44.
498. Before coming to the Court, Brandeis had been deeply involved in establishing dispute resolution mechanisms in the garment industry in New York. In preparing the briefs in
favor of a variety of worker protective legislation, Brandeis also became acquainted with the
conditions of factory life. See generally A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A

FREE MAN'S

LIFE 291-315

(1946) (discussing Brandeis' experience with the New York garment industry). The summer
before the Abrams case, Brandeis had urged Holmes to study the textile industry to get a
grasp on facts. See Letter from Holmes to Laski (May 18, 1919) reprintedin 1 HOLMES-LASKI
LErrEs 204-05 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
499. See I. BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS 91 (1960).
500. "I...
have said whenever it was proper that I thought the President should pardon a lot of poor devils that it was my misfortune to have to write opinions condemning."
Letter from Holmes to Pollock (June 17, 1919), reprinted in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 14,
15 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
501. 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Despite the anonymity of the defendants and the unlikelihood of
succeeding in the call for a general strike, Holmes would have had
difficulty taking the issue of proximity and degree away from the
jury if those were the only factors being considered. 50 2 Abrams
added one more complication. While all the previous cases involved
individuals opposed to the war with Germany, Abrams did not. "It is
absurd to call us pro-German," one of the pamphlets stated. "We
hate and despise German militarism more than do you hypocritical
tyrants. We have more reasons for denouncing German militarism
than has the coward of the White House." 503 The essence of the defendants' position was that President Wilson should remove or be
forced to remove troops from Russia. Holmes may even have been
familiar with this basic argument from his reading of the New Republic, which had carried several articles arguing that the United
States should not be concerned with the Soviet-German agreement
removing Russia from the war and that the United States should
avoid interference with Russia. 50 ' This clear lack of intent to bring
about the proscribed conduct, along with the remote possibility of
harm from the speech, added to the frustration he felt at critics' lack
of understanding to drive Holmes to dissent, and to dissent vigorously, from the majority's upholding of the conviction in Abrams.
The defendant's purpose in halting action against the Soviet
Union formed the core of Holmes' dissent. He began on statutory
grounds. The statute required the urging of curtailment to be done
"with intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United
States in the prosecution of the war. 850 5 Holmes pointed out that a
patriot might urge reduction in airplanes or cannons for the war because they were being supplied in a wasteful manner. 506 The patriot
would intend to curtail production without desiring to injure the war
502. "I assume that the second leaflet if published for the purposes alleged in the fourth
count might be punishable." Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Schaefer v. United
States, 251 US. 466, 483 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting, joined by Holmes, J.)
The question whether in a particular instance the words spoken or written fall
within the permissable curtailment of free speech is, under the rule enunciated by
this court, one of degree. And because it is a question of degree the field in which
the jury may exercise its judgment is, necessarily, a wide one.
Id. at 483, See supra notes 407-12 and accompanying text for Holmes' discussion in Debs of
deference to the jury.
503. 250 U.S. at 625 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
504. See articles at 15 Naw REPUBLIC 130, 302, 328; 16 NEw REPUBLIC 30, 180, 269,
301 (1918).
505. 40 Stat. 553 (1918), quoted in 250 U.S. 626 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
506. 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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effort. If intent were construed as knowledge that the consequences
said to be intended will ensue, the patriot would have the intent to
curtail production and to hinder the United States in the prosecution
of the war in the sense that he would recognize that curtailment
would limit the available munitions for the fighting troops.507 Thus,
Holmes argued that purpose was the critical element under the statute.508 Curtailment urged because the speaker does not want the
United States to fight Germany effectively is reachable, but curtailment urged for other reasons is not.
The statutory interpretation, however, was subordinate to
Holmes' position that such a construction was part of the requirements of the first amendment. "It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in
setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are
not concerned."50 9 In determining the extent of that danger
nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so. Publishing
those opinions for the very purpose of obstructing however, might
indicate a greater danger and at any rate would have the quality of
an attempt.510
In reviewing his previous discussions of attempt, Holmes stated that
[a]n actual intent in the sense that I have explained is necessary to
constitute an attempt, where a further act of the same individual is
required to complete the substantive crime, for reasons given in
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396. It is necessary
where the success of the attempt depends upon others because if
that intent is not present the actor's aim may be accomplished
without bringing about the evils sought to be checked. 511
507. Id.
508. But, when words are used exactly, a deed is not done with intent to produce a
consequence unless that consequence is the aim of the deed. It may be obvious, and
obvious to the actor, that the consequence will follow, and he may be liable for it
even if he regrets it, but he does not do the act with intent to produce it unless the
aim to produce it is the proximate motive of the specific act, although there may be
some deeper motive behind.
Id. at 627 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
509. Id. at 628.
510. Id.
511. Id.
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Violation of the law need not be the "proximate motive" of
speech which in the circumstances creates a present danger of an
immediate evil with which Congress can deal. Unless such a danger
exists, however, speech cannot be punished if the speaker does not
have the aim of creating the prohibited effect. The aim may be
demonstrated by the words themselves, as in the case of direct solicitation of a criminal act, but the mere possibility that the speech
might encourage the commission of a crime is not sufficient to show
the necessary "intent." According to Holmes, it was transparently
clear that the forbidden purpose did not exist in Abrams:
I do not see how anyone can find the intent required by the
statute in any of the defendants' words. .

.

. To say that two

phrases taken literally might import a suggestion of conduct that
would have interference with the war as an indirect and probably
undesired effect seems to me5 1by no means enough to show an attempt to produce that effect.

2

The focus of Holmes' dissent was not the subjective purpose of
the defendants. Holmes' discussion of attempt centered on the need
for an unlawful purpose to convert acts not in themselves criminal
into criminal attempt. In a note to Pollock, he added that he should
have included further emphasis that even if the improper purpose
existed, the act itself must further that unlawful purpose:
The general principles laid down by me I think correct, and the
particular conclusion I adhere to because even if there were evidence of a conspiracy to obstruct, etc. the overt act laid must be an
act done to effect the object of the conspiracy and it seems to me
plain that the only object of the leaflets was to hinder our interference with Russia. I ought to have developed this in the opinion. But
that is ancient history now.513
XIV. CONCLUSION
The Abrams dissent, then, was a product of many factors. The
insignificance of the particular defendants, the inherent incredibility
of their message being acted upon, and the plain purpose to stop
intervention in Russia rather than to oppose the war in Germany
made their case an appropriate one for a judicial finding that no
clear and present danger existed. And Holmes, as author of the ear512. Id. at 628-29.
513. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (December 14, 1919), reprinted in 2 HoLmEs-POLLOCK LsrrEs 32 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
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lier opinions, felt that he had to make this clear: "As the Debs case
and two others were assigned to me, in which the convictions were
upheld, I thought it proper to state what I thought the limits of the
doctrine. 51 4
The passion and eloquence of the dissent in Abrams, however,
had its roots in additional factors. The blind intolerance of opinion
was visibly disturbing the country even after the war was over. The
Espionage Act of 1918 had shown how the government feeds on success to become ever more arrogant and repressive. And the criticism,
even the bomb threat which Holmes had received as a result of the
Debs case, converged to show Holmes that his position in the earlier
cases had been grossly misunderstood. The role of Brandeis, both in
his sensitivity to the facts of a case where the harm alleged was the
potential for labor unrest, and his willingness to join Holmes so that
the Justice was not alone in facing the rest of the Court, which
sought unanimity in the face of feared threats to society, 515 may also
have been important.
The product of these many forces has had an impact far beyond
the specific results of the case, perhaps beyond the limits of the doctrine for which Holmes and Brandeis contended. They were willing
to leave the jury with rather broad scope to be sure that the important interests of the government were protected.5 16 But no judge or
jury in the future would be able to make a determination free from
concern for the vitality of free expression after Abrams:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me per514. Id. (footnote omitted). See also Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske
Stone (May 28, 1940), quoted in Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in Felix Frankfurter's First FlagSalute Opinion, THE 1977 SUPREME COURT REviEw 257, 269 (1978): "I

had so many talks with Holmes about his espionage opinions and he always recognized that he
had a right to take into account the things that he did take into account when he wrote Debs
and the others and the different emphasis he gave the matter in the Abrams case." Id. at 269.
515. See the suggestion in the note to Brandeis with respect to Holmes' unpublished
opinion in Pierce that he would or might "shut up" if all were against him. (Brandeis Papers
-Harvard Law School Manuscript Collection.) The other members of the Court apparently
called on him at home specially to request him to suppress the Abrams dissent. See Cover, The
Left, the Right and the First Amendment: 1918-1928 40 MD. L. REv. 372-73 (1981).
516. See supra note 502. Brandeis' eloquent strictures on free speech in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring) were contained
in a concurrence to the affirmance of her conviction. He pointed out that Anita Whitney failed
to claim that the statute was void because there was no clear and present danger of serious

evil, and thus did not raise the issue for decision by judge or jury. "On the other hand,"
Brandeis wrote, "there was evidence on which the court or jury might have found that such
danger existed. . . .Under these circumstances the judgment of the state court cannot be
disturbed." Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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fectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power
and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you
do not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either
your power or your premises. But when men have realized that
time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the basic test of truth is the power of thought to get
it-self accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system, I
think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of5the
law that an im17
mediate check is required to save the country.
In this passage, the philosophy of Holmes' youth finally merged
with "the law." Whatever doubts may have existed over the ultimate
good of free speech, once Holmes accepted the premise that the first
amendment promises more than the absence of prior restraint, the
values that Mill articulated and Learned Hand reiterated could be
used to buttress judicial protection. Holmes' claim to be a champion
of free speech in the letters he wrote in the summer of 1919 indicate
that he had adopted this position when he decided Schenck, but it
was in Abrams that he first effectively voiced his rationale for protecting speech. His later opinions showed a deepening of his conviction that the Constitution protected dissent. He hinted at the further
rationale that open discussion is the basis of democratic theory when
he used the clear and present danger standard as a basis to test state
actions under the fourteenth amendment. 5 18 Nevertheless, it was the
517. 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
518. "If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to
be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that
they should be given their chance and have their way." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
673 (1925) (Holmes J., dissenting). See also A. MEIKLEJON, POLITICAL FREEDOM 41-43
(1960).
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early Espionage Act cases in the spring of 1919 that marked the
emergence of a new perception of the guarantee of freedom of
speech and of the press in the career of Mr. Justice Holmes.
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